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HEALTH CARE REFORM AND COMPETING
VISIONS OF MEDICAL CARE: ANTITRUST
AND STATE PROVIDER COOPERATION
LEGISLATION
James F. Blumsteint

INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the competing visions of medical care represented by the professional paradigm and the market-based economic paradigm and considers the implications of those visions for
the development of public policy. The first Part identifies the premises underlying the professional model and the influences that have
bolstered each model. Notably, application of antitrust law to the
health care marketplace has contributed to the growing role of the
market paradigm in the health care industry and thus has figured
largely in the debate over health care reform. The second Part discusses recently enacted state legislation designed to facilitate cooperation among health care providers such as hospitals. These laws
purport to provide antitrust immunity under the "state action"
doctrine.
The professional and market-based economic paradigms are
broad conceptual categories. Realistically, the health care arena does
not demand an either-or choice among competing policy options.1
Elements of both visions may be present when one thinks about the
health care marketplace. Historically, the professional paradigm
dominated perception and policy prescription. 2 But now, in the
world of managed care and health care reform, many doctors are frustrated by the perceived inroads on their professional autonomy and
t
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, and Senior Fellow, Vanderbilt Institute
for Public Policy Studies. This Article was funded in part by a grant from the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation. The extraordinary assistance of Allis Dale Gillmor, J.D., Research
Attorney on the Robert WoodJohnson Foundation Project, is hereby acknowledged. The
author is responsible for the analysis and conclusions reached.
1 See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An
Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 V ,Dn. L. REv. 965 (1981).
2 See generally ELOT FRaMSON, PROFESsIoNAL DoMINANcE: THE SocLAL STRucruRE OF
MEDIcAL CARE (1970). For a passionate defense of the professional model and a critique of
perceived inroads of the market-based model, see Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical IndustrialComplex, 303 Naw ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980).
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challenges to the professional orientation of medical care delivery. 3
The key to health care reform is striking the appropriate balance be4
tween these competing policies.
This Article discusses a number of policies that have contributed
to the increased importance of the market paradigm in medical care.
In this regard, the Article argues that the application of antitrust principles to, and the enforcement of those polices in, the health care
marketplace have driven a shift in paradigms-from exclusive reliance on the professional model to a more balanced blend of the professional with the market model.5
The emerging consensus that the market paradigm and the antitrust laws play a fundamental role in the evolution of the nation's
health care system 6 is reflected in the Clinton Administration's original health care reform proposal. At least in its rhetoric, it was influenced by a market-based model. It called for the development and
dissemination of consumer information, the development and utilization of outcomes research, and greater participation of consumers in
decisionmaking. 7 Importantly, there was no broad antitrust exemption in the Clinton plan.8
3 For an expression of physician concern, see Arnold S. Relman, Medical Practice
under the Clinton Reforms-Avoiding Domination by Business, 329 NEv ENG. J. MED. 1574
(1993). For a skeptical discussion of the effect of financial incentives in clinical decisionmaking, see David M. Frankford, ManagingMedical Clinicians' Work Through the Use ofFinancial Incentives, 29 WAKE FoRasr L. Ray. 71 (1994).
4 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform: The Polioy Context, 29 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 15, 17-29 (1994) [hereinafter Health Care Reform].
5 There have been a number of important contributing factors to the increased role
of markets in medical care. Antitrust doctrine is foundational, however, because of its
cultural statement that markets must be allowed to function in the health care industry.
Further and pragmatically, other developments, such as shifts in payment systems and in
the organization of medical practice, have been facilitated by the ban on collective resistance to potentially threatening changes on the demand side of the market. For example,
in AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), the AMA and its Washington, D.C. affiliate
conspired to obstruct an early health maintenance organization (the Group Health Association) from attracting and retaining physicians. See also Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 513 (1990); AMA v. FrC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd
mem. by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); Group Health Coop. of Puget
Sound v. King County Medical Soc'y, 237 P.2d 737 (Wash. 1951).
6 The Congressional debates concerning the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101, demonstrate the importance that members of Congress attached to antitrust in the health care industry. Even regarding statutory immunization of
such a seemingly benign practice as professional peer review, "[c]onsiderable concern was
expressed about abuse of peer-review processes to achieve anticompetitive objectives."
James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and HospitalPeerReview, 51 LAw & CoNmrp.
PROBS. 7, 71 (Spring 1988) [hereinafter HospitalPeer Review]. See 141 CONG. REc. H9957
(dally ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman); id. at H9960-61 (statement of Rep.
Edwards); id. at H9963 (statement of Rep. Tauke).
7 See Blumstein, Health Care Reform, supra note 4, at 20 n.24.
8 For a brief discussion of the antitrust dimensions of the Clinton Administration's
original health care reform proposals, see James F. Blumstein, The Clinton Administration
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In September 1993, prior to the announcement of the Clinton
plan, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) set out enforcement guidelines under the antitrust
laws. 9 These included so-called "safety zones," which would not trigger antitrust enforcement action by either the DOJ or the FTC. 10 DeHealth CareReform Plan:Some PreliminaryThoughts, 19 J. OF HEALTH POL., PoL'y & L. 201,
204 (1994) [hereinafter PreliminaryThoughts].
9 U.S. Dept. ofJustice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in the Health Care Area (Sept. 15, 1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
113,151, at 20,755-68. These guidelines were revised and expanded in September 1994.
U.S. Dept. ofJustice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Enforcement Policy and
Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust (Sept. 27, 1994) [hereinafter
Health Care Antitrust Guidelines].
10 These enforcement guidelines covered six categories of antitrust enforcement policies regarding mergers and various joint activities in the health care area and set forth
safety zones and explanations of the agencies' analysis of activities which fall outside the
antitrust safety zones. The revised 1994 Enforcement Policy Statements, see Health Care
Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 9, cover nine categories: the six covered by the 1993
Guidelines, some of which are modified, and three new ones. The nine categories are as
follows: (1) hospital mergers (essentially unchanged from 1993), (2) hospital joint ventures involving high technology or other expensive medical equipment (expanded to include existing as well as new equipment), (3) hospital joint ventures involving specialized
clinical or other expensive health care services (new with no safety zone provided), (4)
providers' collective provision of non-fee-related information to purchasers of health care
services (expanded from physicians to providers but limited to non-fee-related information), (5) providers collective provision of fee-related information to purchasers of health
care services (new), (6) provider participation in exchanges of price and cost information
(expanded from hospital to provider), (7) joint purchasing arrangements among health
care providers (essentially unchanged), (8) policy on physician networkjoint ventures (essentially unchanged), and (9) analytical principles relating to multiprovider networks (new
with no safety zone provided). Additionally, except for mergers outside the safety zone,
the agencies commit themselves to respond to business review or advisory opinion requests
within 90 days after receiving all necessary information. For example, the enforcement
agencies will not challenge any merger between two general acute-care hospitals where one
of the hospitals over the last three years has an average of fewer than 100 licensed beds, has
an average daily inpatient census of fewer than 40 patients, and the hospital is more than
four years old, absent extraordinary circumstances.
As another example, the enforcement agencies will not challenge any joint venture
among hospitals to purchase, operate, and market the services of high technology or other
expensive medical equipment if the joint venture includes only the number of hospitals
whose participation is needed to support the equipment, absent extraordinary
circumstances.
In the first case settled since the guidelines were published, the Department ofJustice,
the Florida attorney general's office, and two voluntary hospital systems in the St. Petersburg area agreed to a partnership arrangement, but not a merger, allowing the hospitals to
provide services jointly in areas where there are numerous competitors. These areas include some outpatient services, open heart surgery, laboratory and diagnostic services,
some specialized high technology services, and others. Additionally, the hospitals may consolidate administrative services such as accounting, communications, medical staff organization, and medical record keeping. By allowing joint ventures in specialized tertiary care
services that compete over a larger geographic market, the agreement has the potential to
reduce costs by increasing utilization and may improve outcomes by allowing the same
personnel to work together more frequently. The agreement prevents the two systems
from discussing managed care contracting, pricing, or marketing. Landmark Federal-State
Settlement Clears way for Innovative Partnership,3 Health L. Rep. 830-31 (1994).
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spite the positions pressed by the hospital industry and physician
groups for broad antitrust immunity, the Clinton Administration did
not embrace this policy as part of its health reform plan. The rhetoric
and the ideology of the DOJ-FTC enforcement guidelines were not at
odds with fundamental antitrust policies.'1 The "safety zones," encompassing such activities as mergers and joint ventures,' 2 were
deemed by the DOJ and the FTC to identify conduct likely to be procompetitive and efficiency creating. Thus, the conduct falling within
the safety zones would not offend antitrust principles. The safety
zones were packaged and promulgated not as exceptions to, but as
3
enforcement guidelines within, the framework of antitrust policies.'
While antitrust enforcement at the federal level has played an important role in the evolution of the market paradigm in the health
care industry, and such enforcement seems to have achieved considerable political support among influential national policymakers, a policy counterpoint has recently emerged at the state level. A large
number of states have enacted hospital cooperation legislation
designed to use the state action antitrust immunity doctrine, under
11 This point was reinforced by a statement issued at the time of announcement by
Senator Howard Metzenbaum: "We're going to solve a problem in the antitrust field without changing one word, one comma, or one semicolon of the antitrust laws.... We are
here today to clear up confusion among doctors and hospitals about how these laws apply
to them. We want to end their uncertainty.... These policy guidelines are proof positive
that we can make our laws work to accommodate business when their concerns have logic
and merit." Statement by Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum (Sept. 15, 1993), Press Conference

with U.S. Att'y Gen. Janet Reno, First Lady Hillay Clinton, Janet Stiger, Chair, Federal Trade
Commission, Fed. News Service, Sept. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNEWS file. However, Commissioner Deborah K. Owen disagreed and stated that the
risks of higher prices and reduced output or lower quality of care posed to health care
consumers by the proposal outweighed any benefits generated. Furthermore, she took
issue with the premise that sufficient guidance was not available and that the agencies' past
enforcement efforts had been unreasonable. She considered the guidelines to be a special
interest antitrust exemption that should be enacted only legislatively. She particularly disagreed with the merger guideline, which she said could not be reconciled with the analysis
set forth in the 1992 Merger Guidelines (U.S. Dep't ofJustice & Fed. Trade Comm'n Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,104 (Apr. 2, 1991)). She
pointed out that the merger safety zone is not limited in applicability to rural hospitals
operating in isolation nor is there any consideration of the identity of the purchaser; thus,
a large competitor could purchase all the small hospitals in a market area that met the
criteria. Id. 1 13,235.
12 See supra note 10.
13 Although it retained antitrust enforcement as an important part of its mission and
ideology, the original Clinton Administration health care reform plan did embrace an exception. It provided for immunity for doctors who engaged in collective negotiation with
regional alliances for fee-for-service fee schedules. Limited immunity for collective negotiation was granted, but no immunity for a boycott or a threat of boycott on the part of
physicians, both of which are antitrust violations, was included. This provision could be
characterized as a form of "smoke but don't inhale" or "enforce-but-don't-pursue" immunity. There was a nice little legal-political minuet going on, but it was not clear what the
parameters of the immunity were or how it would play out in practice. See Blumstein,
Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 8, at 204.
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Parker v. Brown,1 4 as a way of overcoming antitrust requirements by
allowing states to substitute regulation for competition.1 5
The Article describes briefly those provisions in a paradigmatic
form and evaluates them from a policy perspective. Although such
legislation purportedly aims to achieve economic efficiency, any existing market flaws can be addressed more effectively in other ways,
such as through changes in payment mechanisms. In addition, some
of these state laws authorizing cooperation among health care institutions identify goals other than economic efficiency. However, these
other objectives are too amorphous to be balanced fairly against antitrust law's goal of promoting competition. The use of unidentified
and often unquantified revenue transfers to pursue ambiguous policy
goals may stand in the way of political accountability. Further, these
provisions are unlikely to provide an adequate forum for the representation of unconcentrated political interests such as those of consumers and taxpayers.
This Article concludes by analyzing whether these laws comply
with the requirements of Parkerimmunity. For a state to establish a
Parker defense for private conduct, it must clearly articulate a policy
supporting the substitution of regulation for competition, and it must
actively supervise private conduct to assure that state objectives are
being pursued and fulfilled.' 6 The Parker doctrine allows states to
countermand the federal antitrust policy of procompetition only
when active supervision assures that the authorized private activity
achieves public rather than private purposes.
I
COMPETING VISIONS OF MEDICAL CARE: THE PROFESSIONAL
AND THE MARKET PARADIGMS

Historically, medical care has been characterized by a professional dominance on the part of physicians.' 7 While many factors
14 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
15 The General Accounting Office reports that, as of May 1994, "18 states have attempted to provide immunity from federal and state antitrust laws for some activities of
hospitals and other health care providers." U.S. General Accounting Office, Health Care:
Federal and State Antitrust Actions Concerning the Health Care Industy, at 10 (August 1994)
[hereinafter GAO Report]. The GAO lists the following states: Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Some commenta-

tors have reported that California, Iowa, and Vermont also have enacted such legislation,
see Robert E. Bloch & Donald M. Falk, Antitrust, Competition, and Health Care Reform, 13
HrLTH AreaiRs 206, 229 n.29 (Spring 1994), but the GAO does not list those staies. See
infra part II.B.
16 See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,

105 (1980).
17

See PAUL STARR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 226-27 (1982).
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have contributed to this dominance, two primary reasons stand out.
First, the professional model has provided the necessary intellectual
rationale.' 8 Second, physician control of patient referral (that is, control of business for the industry) and patient billing have provided the
economic power to implement the professional model, especially vis-avis hospitals. 19
Hospitals traditionally have depended on physicians to fill beds.
This gives doctors enormous influence on hospital management. Physicians have sought to maintain control over patient billing as part of
the practice of medicine. Autonomy in billing assures a physician independence of clinical judgment. But also, quite obviously, such control and autonomy provide physicians with strong economic
independence and leverage against other organizational forms in
which physician services are marketed as part of an all-inclusive pack20
age of prepaid services.
A. The Premises Underlying the Professional Paradigm
Under traditional economic theory, a smoothly functioning market requires adequate information so that economic actors can behave
in an economically rational manner. Perhaps the most important rationale advanced by proponents of the professional model is the asymmetry of information held by doctors and patients. 2 ' Critics of the
market model in medical care contend that patients are essentially
ignorant, whereas doctors are extremely well trained and expert. For
advocates of the professional paradigm, what follows from that asymmetry is a justification for disempowering the market model's sovereign consumer. Instead of pursuing a strategy of market
improvement-that is, improving the flow of understandable information or otherwise improving the functioning of the market-proponents of the professional model embrace a strategy of market
substitution, in which the judgment of the physician is substituted for
that of the patient.
18
Cf Frankford, supra note 3, at 79-83 (describing the belief structure underlying the
professional model).
19 For an example of the importance attributed to professional control of billing, see
State v. Abortion Info. Agency, Inc., 330 N.Y.S.2d 927 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd, 285 N.E.2d

317 (N.Y. 1972).
20 "The continued ability of physicians to bill separately for services performed in

hospitals has not only served to maintain their economic independence of hospitals but
their professional independence as well.... Since doctors have traditionally referred patients to hospitals, they have controlled the hospitals' clientele. That power over patients
adds to physicians' autonomy. Thus, continued independence has given physicians, both
individually and collectively, considerable leverage over hospitals." Blumstein & Sloan,
HospitalPeerReview, supra note 6, at 17.
21 See generally Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Car4 53
AM. ECON. RFv. 941 (1963).
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The doctor's claim of expertise arises from scientific training.
The scientific basis of medical training and practice legitimizes professional empowerment. Adoption of the professional model places the
professional in a fiduciary relationship with the patient, for whom the
professional makes decisions. But it also shifts a power between purchaser and service provider. Surrogate (and necessarily paternalistic)
decisionmaking replaces consumer sovereignty. This confers upon
the professional the authority to decide important economic questions concerning the demand for services and standards of quality. In
an environment characterized by third-party financing, professional
control of decisionmaking has led to ever-increasing expenditures in
the name of quality, which is the professionals' watchword in combat22
ing efforts to rein in escalating costs.
Concomitant with the professional model are the duty of professional self-regulation, the commitment to promote and monitor high
standards of quality, and the de-emphasis on economic issues. 23 The
de-emphasis on economic issues reinforces the professional paradigm
by directing attention away from the economic characteristics of medical care service delivery.
Historically, advocates for improved access to care have linked up
with the professionals. For example, in 1965 this alliance resulted in
the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid.2 4 The deal assured unrestricted, tax-generated public money to support access for the poor
and the elderly in exchange for greater physician autonomy through
institutionalized deference to physicians' clinical authority. The doctors were assured that their professional and economic autonomy
would be respected, and public dollars would flow to provide medical
benefits to underserved groups. The Medicare and Medicaid deal
adopted a blank check approach that virtually guaranteed, as commentators predicted, 25 that cost escalation would ensue.
The professional paradigm places power paternalistically in physician hands. Physicians perceive themselves as controlling decisionmaking, and that perception is an important part of the professional
paradigm. Physicians as professionals also control quality through
peer review mechanisms that are part of the professional paradigm.
22 For a general discussion of these issues, see Donald W. Light, Is Competition Bad?,
309 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1315 (1983).
23 See generallyWilliam J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 AM.

Soc. Rnv. 194 (1957) (arguing that the socialization that occurs within professional communities serves to curb the abusive potential inherent in a professional's position).

24

For an appeal to professional autonomy in support of the proposed Clinton re-

forms, see Arnold Epstein, Changes in the Delivery of Care Under Comprehensive Health Care
Reform, 329 NEv ENG. J. MED. 1672 (1993). See also THEODORE MARMOR & JAN MARMOR,
THE POLMCS OF MEDICARE (1973).
25 See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst &James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost TradeOffs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6, 13-15 (1975).
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Because of their expertise and professionalism, physicians look within
the profession for their frame of reference regarding quality
assurance.
This professional decisionmaking hegemony leads to physician
control of costs and output. By shifting control from consumers to
physician fiduciaries, the professional model insulates the medical
services market from economic trade offs. In the traditional economic marketplace, consumers trade off increments of quality because of cost. Once decisionmaking authority is ceded to
professionals, professional standards govern. Decisions are seen as
technical and scientific, so that consensus in decisionmaking is professionally oriented. Quality-cost trade offs are attenuated, and trade offs
between medical care and other goods or services are precluded by
dedicated medical care financing through nontransferable third-party
insurance. Under the professional model, economics and trade offs
become marginalized in the policy debate. Medical care thus becomes an exclusively technical-scientific enterprise.
B.

Techniques for Promoting the Professional Paradigm

This Part identifies four techniques that have been used to promote the professional paradigm. First is freedom of choice of physician for patients, a phenomenon that has been paired with third party
payment. Clearly the idea is to keep financial considerations out of
the patients' deliberative process. The only thing that matters from a
policy perspective is guaranteeing the right of patients to choose their
professional provider, who faces minimal resource constraints because
of third-party payment. That traditionally has meant that no expense
is spared. The medical profession historically has opposed trading off
limited physician choice for economic benefits, a hallmark of man26
aged care.
Second, the professional paradigm has been bolstered by arguments that the imposition of resource constraints and containment of
medical care expenditures will lead to lower quality. The threat to
quality is perceived as the physicians' silver bullet in the debate about
health care policy. In the market, however, the threat of lower quality
should not ring the death knell for proposed policy shifts. Cost-benefit and risk-benefit calculations occur constantly and are an integral
26
In some states, this protection of the professional paradigm, accompanied by a
healthy dose of economic self-interest from providers facing exclusion from managed care
plans, has manifested itself in legislation requiring health plans to contract with any willing
provider. In Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993), the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's any-willingprovider law was not preempted by ERISA. The Clinton Administration's original health
care reform proposal would have preempted such laws. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1407 (1993).
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part of the economic marketplace. If lower quality were the death
knell, we would not have different segments in the automobile industry-only the Lexus, the Infiniti, and the Mercedes would be
manufactured.
In short, policies that lower the quality of care may be rational if
higher levels of quality can be achieved only at extremely high costs.
Intuitively, we all engage in such balancing. We take prudent (and
sometimes even imprudent) risks to achieve objectives that are important to us, or because we believe that the cost of safety is excessive in
that it would cause us to forgo other valuable benefits. Indeed, these
kinds of economic trade-offs are routinely made in the medical care
marketplace, but usually out of the public's sight.2 7 But only aca-

demic types, who are not running for public office, are prepared to
state what should be obvious-that it might be socially optimal to have
lower quality medical care, at least in some circumstances, if the cost
of the highest quality care is too high. In no other marketplace do we
say "spare no expense, cost is irrelevant." It is not radical to suggest
that the highest levels of quality might be sub-optimal and that the
diminution-of-quality argument should not be checkmate in health
policy debates.
The third technique often used to promote and protect the professional paradigm is opposition to rationing.28 This is a great rhetorical ploy. We are told rationing is a terrible thing. "Rationing is a bad
idea." But in the economic marketplace scarce resources are always
allocated to their most beneficial use.
Use of the term "rationing" implies that someone is doing the
choosing. But opponents of rationing do not always focus on that

technical issue. Instead, they employ the term synonymously with the
concept of allocating scarce resources. Yet, the need to allocate resources is a fundamental reality of economic life. Consumers constantly choose among alternatives based upon sensitive consideration
of costs, risks, and benefits.
The rhetoric of rationing and denigration of its use suggest that
economic trade-offs are inappropriate when it comes to health care.
Rationing connotes government control over consumer expenditures.
In the private economic marketplace, resources are allocated not by
government but by the private choice of atomistic decisionmakers27
For example, apparently there are different qualities of artificial hips used in hip
replacement surgery. The choice is not always placed before the patient. Other such decisions involve the kind of contrast agent to be used in a radiologic study, the cost differences between ionic and nonionic contrast agents being enormous.
28 See James F. Blumstein, Distinguishing Government's Responsibility in Rationing Public
and Private Medical Resources, 60 TEx. L. Ruv. 899 (1982) [hereinafter Public and Private
Medical Resources]; James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutiona Legal,
and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. Ruv. 1345 (1981) [hereinafter Rationing].
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households and firms. By failing to recognize that resource allocation
is a normal market function, opponents of rationing impliedly suggest
that private choice plays no part in the medical care marketplace. 29
That form of rhetoric reinforces the tenet of the professional paradigm that medical care service decisions are scientific and technical in
character, without a substantial economic dimension.
Fourth and finally in this regard, proponents of the professional
model have advocated a unitary standard of practice in the medical
services marketplace. In opposing policy proposals to restrain costs,
they warn against a two-tier or multi-tier medical system.3 0 But in the
typical economic marketplace there is nothing unusual about the existence of multiple tiers, which may conform to consumer preferences.
In the absence of special egalitarian claims, there is nothing inherently wrong with multiple levels of quality or multiple styles of
practice. 3 ' Presented honestly, the debate is about what degrees of
difference society will allow, what obligation society has to finance
care for those unable to pay, and who should benefit from public subsidy and in what magnitude. The truth is that serious analysts cannot
persuasively defend the principle of total equality of end result.
There are only two ways to achieve that kind of end-result equalityleveling up or leveling down (or some hybrid of the two
approaches) 32

To achieve single tier equality, one must first establish the level of
care required. Will society make it illegal for those seeking a higher
standard to purchase additional medical care with their own resources, or for providers to sell those services in the marketplace? Is
that the goal? That would be a leveling down scenario, and some coercion would be required to achieve equality given the differences in
29 See Rand Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal"Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEx.
L. REV. 1401 (1981).
30
For a discussion of the medical malpractice issues regarding multiple standards of
care, see James F. Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice, in HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY AND TORT: SYSTEMS ON A COLISION CouRSE? 76, 91-94 (Elizabeth Rolph ed.,

1991) [hereinafter Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice];Jonathan J. Frankel, Note,
Medical MalpracticeLaw and Health Care Cost Containment: Lessonsfor Reformers from the Clash
of Cultures, 103 YALE LJ. 1297 (1994); Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Deniak Can Consumers Contract Today To Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755
(1992); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containmentand the Standardof Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1719 (1987); John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitay Medical MalpracticeStandard,
77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991). Cf Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethicaland Legal Standardsfor
PhysiciansBe Changed to Accommodate New Modelsfor RationingHealth Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1809, 1815-16 (1992) (arguing that the "problem that deserves our attention is not how to
accommodate new forms of rationing.., but how to define necessary as opposed to unneeded care").
31 See, e.g.,James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health
Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REv. 849, 864-67
(1981) [hereinafter Redefining Government's Role in Health Care].
32 See id. at 865.
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preferences and income/wealth in the nation. When unpacked, the
ostensible ideal of a single tier becomes little more than a politically
appealing but analytically vapid rhetorical flourish.3 3 But facing up to
the real debate-what degree of difference in medical services should
society accept-poses tough ethical and economic questions that direct attention away from the professional solution, which is to leave
the level of services to the discretion of the profession with unlimited
public payment.
C.

Legal-Institutional Bulwarks of the Professional Model

The professional model is maintained as the historically prevailing paradigm by a number of legal doctrines and institutional structures. This Part canvasses briefly four bulwarks of the professional
model.
Licensure laws. Licensure laws are intended as a form of quality
assurance.3 4 Typically, they rely on input measures (educational credentials) and process measures (examinations) as proxies for assuring
quality outcomes. An unintended 5 consequence of licensure laws is
that they can limit competition from other types of potentially lowercost providers.
Section 1161 of the Clinton Administration's original health care
reform plan would have preempted state licensure laws.3 6 There are
some significant federalism issues raised by this preemption proposal,3 7 but the Clinton scheme would have dramatically altered licen38
sure law as we know it.
33

See James F. Blumstein, Thinking About Government's Role in Medical Care 32 ST.

Louis U. LJ. 853, 859 (1988):
The impracticality [of equality of access] lies in the excessively high cost of
leveling up to give everybody equal care. This expense would distort our
nation's spending priorities.... On the other hand.... we. are not prepared to level down either, because leveling down has some very negative
consequences.... If we tried to prohibit private expenditures in health
care, a black market would probably develop.
34 See BARRY R. FuRaow Er AL., HEa.
LAw: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 40-42
(1991).
35 The adverse effect on competition is usually unintended in a formal sense. Licen-

sure laws are rarely if ever publicly advocated or defended because of their protective characteristics. However, individuals or professional associations may intend for these anticompetitive features to provide insulation from competitive inroads on turf, much as
union-negotiated work rules function in a collective labor agreement. For a review of these
issues, see Gary L. Gaumer, RegulatingHealth Professionals:A Review of the EmpiricalLiterature,
62 MILBANK MEM. FumN Q. 380 (1984).
36 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1161 (1993).
37 Cf California State Bd. of Optometry v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 910 F.2d 976 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (barring FTC eyeglass regulation and expressing federalism concerns).
38 See Blumstein, Health Care Reform, supra note 4, at 20 n.23; Blumstein, Preliminay
Thoughts, supra note 8, at 204-05.
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Section 1161 of the Clinton health care reform plan provided as
follows: "No state may, through licensure or otherwise, restrict the
practice of any class of health professionals beyond what is justified by
the skills and training of such professionals." That provision promised
a significant assault on the citadel of licensure. Nonphysician health
professionals such as nurses could challenge licensure restrictions by
asserting that, through "skills and training," they are capable of performing and should be authorized to provide an array of services traditionally considered part of the practice of medicine reserved for
physicians. If nonphysicians' "skills and training" would 'justif[y]"
their performing a task, then the Clinton proposal would abrogate
traditional prerequisites imposed by state licensing authorities. This
would go a long way toward eroding the turf-based protections that
physicians and other licensed health professionals have enjoyed. Such
a proposal would be strongly procompetitive and promarket, greatly
39
undermining the professional paradigm.
Hospital Accreditation. The accreditation standards of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) 4 0 institutionalize physician autonomy within hospitals by requiring that the medical staff have an independent 4' organization and
structure. 42 No health care institution besides the hospital is forced
by accreditation standards or otherwise to adopt that form of governance arrangement. The required division of authority within the hospital creates potential management problems. Lines of authority and
accountability are blurred, even as evolving principles of liability impose greater obligations for risk management and quality assurance
on hospital administrators. 43 And changes in payment through managed care arrangements, which place hospitals at risk financially, require hospital administrators to control costs. The organizational
structure mandated by accreditation standards impedes the ability of
hospital administrators to manage their institutions as other economic
39 Section 1161 was drafted in open-ended terms and could have generated excessive
litigation. Further, since licensure laws typically carry a criminal penalty, there should be
clarification of the boundaries so that professionals will not be at risk of criminal liability.
40 TheJoint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) is now the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). See FuP. ow ET AL., supra

note 34, at 99-102.
41 See, e.g., SaintJohn's Hosp. Med. Staff v. SaintJohn's Regional Med. Ctr., Inc., 245
N.W.2d 472 (S.D. 1976) (holding that medical staff bylaws constituted a contract with the

hospital and could not be amended unilaterally by the hospital).
42 For a discussion of the role of the hospital medical staff and its relationship with
the hospital board, see Report of the AMA/AHA Joint Task Force on Hospital-Medical
Staff Relationships (1985). See generallyTimothy S.Jost, TheJoint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals:PrivateRegulation ofHealth Care and the PublicInterest 24 B.C. L. Rv.835 (1983).
43 See, e.g., Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677
P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984);Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis.
1981).
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entities are managed. The institutionalization of physician autonomy
is preserved but, in an evolving marketplace, at the risk of poor institutional adaptation.
Corporate Practice Doctrine. The corporate practice doctrine re44
stricts corporations from providing professional medical services.
Some jurisdictions have statutory restrictions, which typically set forth
exceptions for certain practices such as health maintenance organizations or academic medical centers. 45 In most jurisdictions, however,
the corporate practice restriction is inferred from the existence of licensure laws. Since only licensed professionals are authorized to practice in these jurisdictions, corporations, which are not licensed
professionals, may not engage in the practice of medicine.
In practical terms, the corporate practice doctrine prevents physicians from working within a corporate framework unless statutorily
authorized to do so. Billing for services is often considered part of the
practice of medicine, so corporate entities such as hospitals may not
46
offer all-inclusive pricing for services that include professional fees.
The corporate practice rule supports the professional paradigm.
Physicians must have a direct relationship with their patients unencumbered by financial concerns related to their employment relationship with a corporation. Billing autonomy is part of assuring fiscal
47
and therefore clinical independence.
In the emerging world of managed care and capitation payment,
the restriction on corporate billing may discourage a hospital from
choosing to become a risk-bearing managed care organization. The
corporate practice doctrine can also impede the ability of health care
institutions to reduce costs by hiring physicians on their staff. By restricting a form of competition, the corporate practice doctrine insulates physicians from downward pressure on fees. 48 While the precise
status of the corporate practice doctrine is still a matter of some dispute, the residual corporate practice doctrine is a potential legal
landmine for an industry seeking to develop new structures and relationships in response to market pressures. 49 The doctrine serves as a
44 SeeArnold Rosoff, The Business of Medicine: Problems with the CorporatePracticeDoctrine,
17 CUMB. L. REv. 485, 490 (1987); Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The CorporatePracticeof
Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAD. L. REv. 445,
446 (1987).
45
See, e.g., California Att'y Gen., Op. No. 81-1004 (April 7, 1982).
46 See State v. Abortion Info. Agency, Inc., 330 N.Y.S.2d 927 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd,
285 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1972).
47 See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 44.
48
See generally Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior. Legal Barriersto
Health Care Cost Containmen 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 510 (1988).
49 See id. at 509-11.
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reminder of the ongoing institutionalization of the professional
50
paradigm.
Fraud and Abuse. The existing federal ban on purported "fraud
and abuse" represents an intimidating misnomer and, with respect to
some critical provisions, is to a substantial degree an anachronism. 51
Perhaps because the label is so daunting, there have been no serious
efforts to modify the policy. Surely it is politically unappealing to face
headlines suggesting that one is seeking to water down tough federal
laws against fraud and abuse.
Certain portions of existing fraud and abuse legislation, as interpreted by the federal courts5 2 and the United States Department of

Health and Human Services, 53 are premised on largely outmoded adherence to a hard-core version of the professional paradigm. These
provisions have created significant barriers to market-oriented attempts to rationalize the medical care marketplace. The doctrine discourages vertical integration and other forms of cooperative
integration. The fraud and abuse laws must be reexamined if market
incentives are to succeed within the medical care system. In short,
there is a clash of cultures here.
The pivotal case to interpret federal antifraud and abuse law is
United States x Greber.5 4 Greber illegalized "remuneration" (direct or
indirect) aimed at inducing future referrals or purchases. 55 Even
when the services sought or provided are perfectly legitimate (i.e.,
50

Section 1407 of the Clinton Administration's health reform proposal, H.R. 3600,

103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1407, provided for the elimination of state laws banning the corporate practice of medicine. In that way the Clinton proposal furthered the market paradigm
by leveling the legal playing field, allowing different forms of practice to coexist within the
law.
51 For a conceptual discussion of the anti-fraud and abuse laws, see David M. Frankford, CreatingandDividing the Fruits of Collective EconomicActivity: Referrals Among Health Care
Providers,89 COLUM. L. REv. 1861 (1989); Mark A. Hall, MakingSense of ReferralFeeStatutes,
13J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 623 (1988).

52 See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
Accord, United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
53 See H.H.S. Proposed Rules Regarding Civil Penalty and Exclusion Authority, 42
C.F.R. pt. 1000, 1001.901 (1990); H.H.S. Proposed Safe Harbor Rules, 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001
(1989). See also Office of Inspector General, Special Fraud Alert: Joint Venture Arrangements (Apr. 1989), reprintedin Medicare & Medicaid Guide (1992 Transfer Binder) (CCH)

140,200.

54 760 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1985). Although the facts in Greber were in some dispute,
perhaps implicating an old-fashioned kickback, the Third Circuit assumed in its analysis
that more was involved than a question of payment for services not provided.
55 The language construed in Greberis codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2) (1988):
Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertily, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing... of any item

or service for which payment may be made.., under [Medicare] ....

or
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medically indicated) and the fee charged is reasonable and appropriate, there may be a criminal violation.
In Greber,a physician recommended that a patient undergo a test.
That test needed interpretation, and the testing company (owned by a
second physician) paid the referring doctor to perform the interpretation. The court assumed that the referring physician was competent
and actually performed the interpretation.
The second physician admitted that one reason for having the
referring doctor interpret the test was concern about future referrals.
The second physician, who owned the testing company, defended his
conduct on the ground that the referring physician had competence
to perform the task and already had a relationship with the patient.
At the same time, the second physician acknowledged his belief that
he would not receive future referrals if he did not request interpretations from the referring physician.
The Grebercourt upheld the second doctor's conviction for violating the fraud and abuse law. It held that a violation is established if a
factor in the decisionmaking process was use of "remuneration" (i.e.,
payment of a legitimate fee) to "induce" future referrals, even if appropriately carried out and medically indicated. The court expressly
rejected the argument that such inducement must be a dominant or
predominant factor, or that the services provided must be in some way
inappropriate. Any economic motivation concerning use of remuneration as an inducement suffices to constitute a violation.
Thus, under Greber, which has been followed in two other circuits5 6 and by the Inspector General at the United States Department

of Health and Human Services, 5 7 a motivation to develop business, to
increase the flow of patients, is illegal. Yet, in the economic marketplace the development of business is an ever-present motivation. As
interpreted, the fraud and abuse legislation precludes that type of
market response, making business development through inducing future referrals a felony.58 The fraud and abuse laws therefore serve to
support the traditional professional paradigm, which in its hardest(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made.., under [Medicare] ...shall be guilty of a felony ....
56 See United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bay State
Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
57 See supra note 53.
58 Consider the following- A patient approaches his doctor and says: "Mydaughter is
applying to college, will you write a recommendation?" Suppose the doctor says to himself,
"ifI do not write a letter, this patient may not come back and visit me again and may
discontinue sending other patients to me." If that thought becomes a factor in the decision, writing that letter (a form of indirect "remuneration") could be a felony because of
the doctor's intent to "induce" future business. This would be the case even if the doctor
genuinely wished to support the daughter's application with enthusiasm.
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boiled form is impervious to economic trade offs. The fraud and
abuse laws criminalize market-adaptive conduct and in that sense warrant thorough reexamination. 59
D.

Inroads on the Professional Model

This Part of the Article discusses six inroads on the professional
model that, in a legal or policy sense or both, have contributed to the
emergence of market-based competition in the delivery of medical
care services.
Informed consent. Common law principles recognize personal autonomy by requiring consent before a physician is authorized to touch
a patient. The question commonly posed in tort litigation is whether
a patient's consent is effective. To be effective, consent must be "informed." 60 Although the cause of action for contact without consent
originally sounded in battery, the concept largely has evolved into a
negligence-based analysis. 6' Still, the question is, what degree of disclosure is required before a patient's consent is deemed effective be62
cause informed?
Originally, the adequacy of disclosure was measured by a professional standard-what the reasonable, prudent physician would disclose to the patient under the circumstances. The frame of reference
for determining the adequacy of disclosure to patients was that of a
similarly situated physician. However, the law has evolved dramatically, shifting from the reasonable doctor standard, a professional
model, to a reasonable patient standard. In the jurisdictions that follow the reasonable patient approach-about half the states6 3-the inquiry focuses on what information a reasonable patient would want to
have disclosed. The analysis no longer relies on what professionals as

59
This component of the fraud and abuse laws may be anachronistic in a world of
prepayment and capitation. It is premised on the idea that payment of "remuneration" to
"induce" future referrals will expand utilization and thereby increase Medicare costs. If
payments are fixed in advance, then the opportunity to engage in this type of abuse is
largely eliminated. The providers, not the government payor, are financially at risk in such
situations.
60
See generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consen 103 YALE LJ. 899 (1994)
(discussing development and principal theories of the informed consent doctrine).
61
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). A battery claim does lie, however, where there is a failure to obtain any consent, as
when a patient consents to surgery by one doctor but another (different) doctor performs
the operation. See Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 439-40 (N.J. 1983).
62
For discussion of the role that a patient-centered informed consent inquiry could
have in improving the functioning of the health care marketplace, see Blumstein & Sloan,
Redefining Government's Role in Health Care, supra note 31, at 902-08.
63
See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 34, at 336.
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surrogates and fiduciaries deem appropriate disclosure for their
64
patients.
The impetus for the shift in the informed consent doctrine has
three political-analytical tributaries: marketeers advocating expansion
of information flow to enhance the role of consumers in the marketplace;65 consumer groups advocating the philosophy of personal
choice, control of one's own body ("my body, my self"), and individual empowerment; 66 and antihegemony egalitarian groups that do not
want to see excessive power in the hands of professionals at the expense of their patients. 67 These groups make for an interesting and
potentially potent political coalition.
Preliminary evidence shows that as the degree of disclosure expands, patient autonomy and empowerment increase. Greater patient knowledge of the risks and benefits of different surgical
procedures in turn affects procedure rates. 68 For example, when men
are told about the consequences of nonmalignant prostate enlargement and the risks and benefits of surgical treatment, prostate surgery
rates decrease dramatically. 69 This evidence supports the view that
consumer ignorance in the medical services context can be overcome
by the sharing of information. The heightened disclosure brought on
in part by revised informed consent rules has facilitated the market
paradigm's rise. The professional in this model supports rather than
supplants informed patient decisionmaking
Hospital liability. For nearly thirty years, since the Illinois Supreme
Court's 1965 decision in Darlingv. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital70 the issue of hospital liability has been critically important in the
malpractice arena. Darlingunderscored the changed role of hospitals
by imposing on them a duty to monitor the quality of medical staff
selected and retained and the level of care delivered within the institu64 See Schuck, supra note 60, at 916 ("The disclosure standard... is that which would
be sought by a prudent or reasonable patient, a standard that emphasizes the value of
patient autonomy over that of professional judgment.").
65
See Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health Care, supranote 31, at

902-08.

66
See, e.g., Marjorie Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE LJ.219 (1985); Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in CatastrophicDisease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 365-76 (1973).
67

For a description of the egalitarian case against professional prerogatives, see
389-93.

STARR, supra note 17, at
68

Joseph F. Kasper et al., Developing SharedDecision-MakingProgramsto Improve the Qual-

ity of Health Care, 18 QUALIY REv. Buu. 183, 184 (June 1992).
69
Id. Men with a nonmalignant but enlarged prostate are informed that they may
have to get up to go to the bathroom once or more at night, watching for potential malignancy or severe enlargement that can interfere with urination. The alternative is surgery,
with possible side effects of incontinence, impotency, or both. Increasingly, men appear to
choose to get up at night and urinate.
70
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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tion. Darlingrecognizedthat hospitals could no longer be passive participants in the medical services delivery process. Hospitals now have
a responsibility to their patients to assure capable medical and nursing
staffs. Breach of that duty and resulting injury can subject a hospital
to great civil liability.
Whereas Darlingfound liability on the basis of a hospital's breach
of a primary duty of quality assurance owed to a patient, subsequent
cases in a number ofjurisdictions have developed legal theories under
which hospitals may be found liable for negligent conduct. The doctrine of ostensible agency, for example, imposes vicarious liability on a
hospital based on a patient's reasonable belief that care was being delivered under the supervision of and on behalf of the hospital. 71 Similarly, hospitals have been held responsible for conduct in their
emergency rooms, even when the emergency rooms were staffed by
independent physician groups functioning as independent contractors. 72 In a growing number ofjurisdictions, courts have adopted the

theory of corporate negligence, 73 which assigns responsibility for conduct within the hospital even in the absence of a plausible claim of
ostensible agency. And, proposals advanced at the national level
would assign liability for hospital-based negligence to the institution
rather than holding individual physicians liable for malpractice. 74
As a result of these developments in the law of hospital liability,
the duty to screen and monitor quality within hospitals increasingly is
71 See, e.g., Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Mich. 1978).
In these ostensible agency cases, it is unclear whether hospitals could avoid liability by
disclosure-i.e., whether this is a transitional doctrine in a movement towards institutional
liability. In Grewe, the Michigan Supreme Court expressly reserved the question whether a
hospital can escape liability where the patient knew or should have known that the physician was not an employee.
72 Hospital liability for the negligent conduct of independent contractor physicians in
emergency rooms may attach under a theory of ostensible agency, see Hardy v. Brantley,

471 So.2d 358, 369 (Miss. 1985), or under a theory of nondelegable duty, seeJackson v.
Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Alaska 1987). The Alaska Supreme Court in Jackson applied
both theories of liability. The Court made it clear that the doctrine was not one of strict
liability but of vicarious liability for the negligence of emergency department personnel,
including those with independent contractor status.
73 See, e.g., Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991). The hospital's duties
are: (1) "to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and
equipment"; (2) "to select and retain only competent physicians"; (3) "to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care"; and (4) "to formulate, adopt
and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients." Id. at 707.
74 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, EnterpriseMedical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REv. 381 (1994); Paul Weiler et al.,
ProposalforMedical Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355 (1992). The original Clinton Administration health care reform proposal included a demonstration project on enterprise liability. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5311 (1993). For a discussion of tort principles
applied to integrated health care networks, see Sharon M. Glenn, Comment, Tort Liability
of Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems: Beyond EnterpriseLiability, 29 WAKE FoREST L. REv.
305 (1994).
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thrust on hospital administrators. Hospitals cannot absolve themselves of liability by relying upon their medical staffs. They are, instead, responsible for their staff's activities.
This trend provides a tremendous impetus toward greater hospital management involvement in quality assurance. It puts considerable pressure upon the JCAHO model of hospital accreditation, which
calls for medical staff autonomous from hospital management.7 5 Increasingly, well-counseled hospital managers are realizing that they
cannot circumvent their quality assurance responsibilities by relying
entirely on the hospital's medical staff. Since hospitals increasingly
are held liable for medical maloccurrences that occur within their
walls, hospital administrators are under enormous legal and institutional pressure to perform quality monitoring and screening functions. In turn, this liability-driven impetus for hospital management
oversight threatens physician autonomy and self-regulation. Quality
assurance no longer is within the exclusive domain of professional
peers. Instead, management of risk and quality is becoming an administrative task much as it is in other economic entities. This phenomenon shifts the medical services sector away from the professional
model of peer review and toward a market-based paradigm.
Hospital advertisingand marketing. Historically, hospitals have depended on physicians to admit patients. Arid, under traditional methods of third-party (usually cost-based) financing of hospital care,
hospitals were rewarded economically for filling beds. Consequently,
hospitals were reliant on physicians to assure their economic well-being. That, coupled with the autonomous status of the medical staff
provided for byJCAHO accreditation standards, 76 has assured physi77
cians great influence in the administration of hospitals.
Through advertising and marketing, hospitals are seeking to establish and maintain a flow of patients on their own. In the evolving
managed care environment, 78 hospitals are developing mechanisms
for seeking out patients. Further, to the extent that financing mecha75

See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
77
For a general discussion of the various influences on hospitals, see Robert C. Clark,
Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the HospitalIndustiy t,93 HAuv. L. REv. 1416 (1980); Mark Pauly &
Michael Redisch, The Not-For-ProfitHospitalas a Physicians' Cooperative 63 AM. ECON. Rxv. 87
(1973).
78 In the managed care environment, hospitals perform a variety of roles. Often, they
negotiate directly with third-party payors to provide services to the payors' covered population. These services may be traditional hospital inpatient care, or they may represent a
continuum of care in which hospitals provide both inpatient and outpatient services. Hospitals seeking to broaden the services they offer can achieve this goal through vertical integration. Under managed care, hospitals also can contract with payors, such as insurance
companies, to provide traditional hospital services to insureds. Clearly, hospitals are functioning at different levels in the market, both providing opportunities for and competing
with other players in the market. For a description of different organizational forms, see
76
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nisms rely on prepayment at fixed rates, hospitals are starting to view
physicians as potential cost escalators rather than as business
79
generators.
In a sense, managed care changes everything. Hospital advertising and marketing and the shift toward fixed payment methods undermine the historically exclusive control exercised by doctors over
patient referrals. In an ironic role reversal, as hospitals contract with
managed care organizations, the hospitals control the flow of patients
to the doctors.8 0 This has dramatically altered the power relationships
between hospitals and doctors. 8 ' In the new economic climate, tensions are bound to erupt8 2 because hospitals are under considerable
financial pressure to oversee utilization patterns of physicians, who are
now cost enhancers rather than bed fillers.8 3 And as hospitals continue channeling patients to the doctors rather than vice versa, the
hospitals may be in a position to reduce the professional practice autonomy currently enjoyed by physicians in hospitals. This promises
further erosion of the professional model and expanded reliance on
the cost-benefit calculus of the market paradigm.
Carl H. Hitchner et al., IntegratedDelivery Systems: A Surey of OrganizationalModels, 29 WAKE
FoREsT L. REv. 273 (1994).
79
To the extent that their patients pay hospitals on a traditional fee-for-service basis,
physicians remain important business generators. Therefore, a physician's patient mix will
have an important impact on the physician's relationship with the hospital where he

practices.
80

This point is dramatized in the many communities in which hospitals now manage

and advertise physician referral programs. Hospital influence over the referrals of patients
to doctors effects a shift in the historical physician-hospital relationship.
81 This power shift is also furthered by the strategy of many hospitals to purchase the
practices of primary-care physicians in order to assure a flow of patients. To protect
against charges of fraud and abuse in subsequent referrals, the physicians often become
employees of the hospital. Employee status is a safe harbor and provides immunity from
fraud and abuse violation. See42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i). The sale of a practice is only immunized by a fraud and abuse safe harbor if the practice is sold to "another practitioner" and
if the selling physician "will not be in a position to make referrals to, or otherwise generate
business for, the purchasing practitioner." Id. at § 1001.952(e) (2). Of course, the availability of the employee status safe harbor is subject to question in jurisdictions adhering to
the ban on the corporate practice of medicine. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying
text.
82 See, e.g., Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa.
1987), aff'dpercurianz, 849 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1988); Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp.,
465 N.E.2d 554 (Il1.App. Ct. 1984).
83 Thus, competition gives the hospital a practical reason to assert its own interest.... [I]f the hospital competes for business on a fixed-price basis, the
hospital will not be able to tolerate profligate practices on the part of its
admitting physicians. The hospital will not want to keep physicians who engage in apparently wasteful behavior....

Therefore, as the market be-

comes more and more competitive, hospitals increasingly become forced to
act in their own institutional self-interest as efficiency-maximizing organizations rather than in the interests of physicians.
Blumstein & Sloan, HospitalPeerReview, supra note 6, at 59-60.
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Clinical uncertainty. The professional paradigm is built on the
premise that the practice of medicine is primarily a technical-scientific
pursuit. The concept of professional privilege stems from the expertise and technical competence attributed to physicians.8 4 Medical
malpractice actions reflect this scientific assumption when evidence is
sought from professionals regarding appropriate treatments in given
circumstances. The underlying premise of such actions is that there is
a single standard of care that professionals are duty bound to follow. 5
Research findings, however, cast considerable doubt on the viability of this assumption. Evidence shows that clinical uncertainty
rather than a single scientific standard governs the actual practice of
medicine. There are dramatically different procedure rates in similar
regions for similar conditions. When variables are controlled for potentially relevant patient characteristics such as age, education, and
income, researchers still observe widely divergent rates for such procedures as tonsillectomies, adenoidectomies, and hysterectomies in
86
demographically comparable regions.
These findings undermine the claim of supreme physician authority based on scientific expertise. The variation in practice styles
across regions suggests that clinical uncertainty is a fact of life. The
research also makes clear that physicians are unsure about optimal
utilization levels for medical resources. Indeed, these findings on
clinical uncertainty have triggered concerns regarding clinical efficacy
that contribute in large part to the current passion for outcomes
87
research.
In the present context, clinical uncertainty and the lack of scientific consensus on many facets of medical practice suggest that there is
a greater role for consumer participation in decisionmaking. The impossibility of precise physician choices based on scientific certainty
creates room for consumers to be educated about the factors relevant
to their own medical choices.
Many medical decisions are influenced by risk preferences, lifestyle choices, and other nonmedical considerations. These are matters upon which consumers can be, and increasingly are being,
consulted for a richer decisionmaking partnership between patients
and providers. In this scheme, providers serve as counselors rather
84 See Frankford, supranote 3, at 86-88 (discussing the myth of "real science" permeating the medical field).

85 See Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice,supra note 30; Hirshfeld,
supra note 30.
86 See, e.g., John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposalfor
Action, 3 HE.AIT AFr. 6 (Spring 1984).
87 See Tavs F. Andersen & Gavin Mooney, Medical Practice Variations: Where Are We?, in
THE CHALLENGES OF MEDICAL PRACTICE VAMATIONS 1 (Tavs F. Andersen & Gavin Mooney
eds., 1990).
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than decisionmakers.8 8 Further, clinical uncertainty highlights the increasing importance of economic incentives in shaping medical care
choices. If there is a range of potentially appropriate options, then
economic considerations will play a greater role in the decisionmaking process.
The existence of clinical uncertainty reinforces the importance of
consumer involvement and suggests that decisionmaking in medical
care is much closer to consumer decisionmaking in other economic
sectors than the professional paradigm suggests. The claim to professional privilege based on specialized knowledge and competence is
modified by greater patient involvement in decisions affecting life and
health, which reflects the move towards a market model.
Cost escalation. Increased public budget costs for the Medicaid
and Medicare programs have prompted recent efforts to constrain
those costs. Much of the political impetus for health care reform derives from the dramatic cost escalation and resulting strain on public
resources stemming from Medicare and Medicaid-the financial Pacmen of public programs.8 9
The health care industry's response to cost-containment initiatives in these public programs was not to develop less costly ways of
delivering services, or marginally to reduce quality to contain costs.
Instead, the industry treated costs and method of service delivery as
constants that would have to be absorbed by other payors. 90 This response by the industry reflected adherence to a typical professional
paradigm.
The cost-shifting strategy indicates the industry's unwillingness to
come to grips with the growing societal pressure to contain public resource commitments. Cost-shifting strategies can succeed only if (a)
other buyers (onto whom costs are shifted) lack market leverage, or
(b) transaction costs of prudent, aggressive purchasing by other buyers exceed potential benefits to those buyers in terms of cost savings. 9 1
In this sense, cost shifting is an unstable condition since its success
88 Gina Kolata, Their Treatment, Their Lives, TheirDecisions,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994, at
G66; Kasper et al., supra note 68.
89 This is hardly a phenomenon of recent vintage. See Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining
Government's Role in Health Care, supra note 31, at 850-52.
90 For a discussion of cost shifting, see Charles E. Phelps, Cross-Subsidies and ChargeShifting in American Hospitals,in UNCOMPENSATED HosPrrAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILI.
TiES 108 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986).

91 Such transaction costs represent efforts to overcome apathy or ignorance. See generally MICHAEL A. MORRISuE, COST SHIFrlNG IN H.ALTH CARE: SEPARATING EVIDENCE FROM
RHroRIC 85-89 (1994) (concluding that hopsitals charge insured patients as much as they
can, that these higher prices allow hospitals to provide care to uninsured patients, that the
existence of more uninsured patients will not result in higher hospital charges, and that
increased health insurance coverage for the uninsured will not result in lower hospital
prices).
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hinges on a passive payor community. As the potential for cost savings
increases, the incentives to become knowledgeable and to increase
market leverage expand. As private payors become more informed
and more aggressive in buying medical services, such cost shifting inevitably becomes more difficult. That, in turn, has led hospitals to
seek relief by securing greater public financing.
One interesting approach to dealing with Medicaid cost escalation and the cost-shifting phenomenon is the innovative TennCare
program adopted by the State of Tennessee. 92 TennCare operates as
a substitute for Tennessee's Medicaid program, functioning under a
waiver from the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. TennCare employs a capitated payment approach. The state
designates a certain number of dollars per patient (per "covered life,"
as the industry argot now has it) and contracts with managed care
organizations (MCOs), which are responsible for paying or providing
93
for all the services required in the contract's specifications.
The state leaves the MCOs to figure out how best to provide the
specified services and to allocate scarce resources while living within a
fixed budget. Practice patterns and utilization rates seem to have
been affected by the change in financing. Although the evidence is
still preliminary, early reports indicate that emergency room admissions at some major hospitals and intensity of resource utilization for
94
inpatients have declined substantially.
Providers are finding different ways to deliver medical care,
changing the technology (the "production function") by which medical care is delivered in response to economic incentives. Under the
professional paradigm, which assumes that there is a right way to do
things unaffected by considerations of cost, one would not expect cutbacks in payments to alter the product provided. Belief in a single
correct approach necessarily creates the expectation that funding
must be provided to pay for appropriate levels and styles of service.
92

See Blumstein, Health CareReform, supra note 4, at 40-42.
Uninsured residents of Tennessee may buy into TennCare on the same terms as
state employees receive their medical care benefits (with a sliding scale of subsidies for
residents with lower income). Access to TennCare for the uninsured was seen as a means
of overcoming the problem of hospitals' uncompensated care revenue loss.
94 State TennCare Director Manny Martins said a survey commissioned by the state
shows that access to care is improving and unnecessary emergency room use has dropped
substantially. Dr. Virgil Crowder, President of the Tennessee Medical Association, disputed this, however. Duren Cheek, TennCare Troubles Persist,IMA President Contends, THE
TENNFSSEAN, Sept. 2, 1994, at B5. According to state officials, use of the emergency rooms
by people enrolled in a TennCare plan operated by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee dropped by 90% in the first five months of the program. That indicates that more
patients have access to primary care and that they are being discouraged from using the
emergency room for minor problems. Bill Snyder, TennCare Covering More and Cutting
Costs, NAssWLLE BANNER, Aug. 29, 1994, at Al. Undoubtedly, part of the story is the availability of other sources of primary care.
93
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Adherence to the (misguided) professional model essentially rejects
consideration of economic trade offs between quality and cost. It also
reflects a rigid (and outmoded) egalitarian idea that all consumers in
the marketplace should undergo identical treatments, practice styles,
and risk calculations, irrespective of individual tastes and resource
availability.
The mindset of the health care industry has been that even if
payors reduce payment levels, providers are still going to deliver top
levels and style of care. The industry's claim is that society must find a
way to pay for the highest possible level of care. That is the thinking
of the professional model.
But adjustment to resource constraints, to a world without a subsidized blank check, is what must and will happen in the medical care
marketplace. The industry must accommodate this reality by tailoring
the delivery of service to the level of resources available. In the
United States health care context, the relevant range of discussion
does not even contemplate a low or even a moderate level and style of
care. The substance of the debate regarding cost containment, even
for public beneficiaries, is whether to come down out of the stratosphere and return into the atmosphere. Still, this type of resourceoriented evaluation of costs and benefits is in considerable tension
with the professional model and moves policymaking along the continuum towards market-oriented principles.
Antitrust. The law of antitrust has both substantive and symbolic
importance in the conflict between the professional and market paradigms. Antitrust law is the virtual engine of the market paradigm. By
referring to competition, economic efficiency, and consumer welfare,
it shifts the vocabulary of the policy dialogue. In very fundamental
ways, application of antitrust principles to the medical care arena
transforms thinking about certain issues.
In the past, under the influence of the professional paradigm and
in the name of health planning, hospital managers were taught to
work together cooperatively, coordinating services with other institutions to improve the health care delivery system and to eliminate
"wasteful duplication." 95 When viewed through the prism of antitrust
doctrine, that type of collaborative conduct may appear suspect. It is
seen as territorial market division among actual or potential competi96
tors, illegal per se under the antitrust laws.
95

See Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services By "Certificate of

Need," 59 VA. L. REy. 1143, 1148-51 (1973).
96
See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Cf Havighurst, supra
note 95, at 1149 ("[M]any of the activities undertaken in the name of planning were indistinguishable from such typical cartel practices as output restriction (collective determination of bed supply) and market division (allocation of areas of responsibility both
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Antitrust poses a conflict of cultures and imposes a confrontation
between those cultures. 97 The very same action-filtered through different prisms (the competitive model and the professional model),
reflecting different experiences and different policy approaches-is
viewed as either appropriate and constructive or as harmful and even
felonious.9 8
Doctors historically have acted collectively, as a strategy to assert
and retain professional prerogatives. For example, doctors (or dentists) have engaged in group boycotts to resist fee pressures, 99 have
opposed alternative payment mechanisms to stop the growth of
HMOs, 0 0 and have issued collective threats against insurance companies that challenge the blank check approach to payment that assures
physician autonomy. 10 As with cooperation between hospitals, antitrust doctrine poses a substantive threat to such strategic collective
activity.
Antitrust doctrine evaluates collective conduct based on efficiency and consumer welfare. 10 2 It encourages economic entities to
compete away excess ("supranormal") profits, assuming that competition "promote [s] consumer welfare by compelling producers to offer
goods of optimal quality at the lowest price." 0 3 As a result, enforcement of the procompetitive regime envisioned by the antitrust laws
reduces opportunities for cross subsidization. In the absence of supranormal returns, economic entities are less able to transfer profits from
one area to subsidize other, less profitable services.
geographically and by activity)."). See also Blumstein & Sloan, Hospital PeerReview, supra
note 6, at 8-9 (discussing this dissonance).
97
See generally Clark C. Havighurst, The Antitrust Challenge to the Professional Paradigm of Medical Care, The Michael M. Davis Lecture, The Center for Health Administration Studies at the University of Chicago (May 4, 1990). Leonard Abramson, Chief
Executive Officer of U.S. Healthcare Inc., has cogently stated that "[u] nless you change the
culture of the community you're working in, you're not changing health care." See Ron
Winslow, U.S. HealthcareCuts Costs, Grows Rapidly and Irks Some Doctors,WALL ST.J., Sept. 6,
1994, at Al.
98 This is something that is hard for people trained in the professional medical paradigm to understand or to accept. For example, acting collectively seems like a natural
response to some perceived wrong or inequity. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447 (1986) (group boycott of dental insurer seeking to impose cost controls);
Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990) (AMA group boycott
of chiropractors).
99 See, e.g., In re Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983).
100 See, e.g., AMA v. United States, 317 U.S: 519 (1943).
101 See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). Hospitals, too, have
resisted cost cutting measures by payors. See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins.
Co., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
102
See generally David L. Meyer & Charles F. (Rick) Rule, Health Care CollaborationDoes
Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FoaxsT L. Rxv. 169 (1994) (arguing that

the free-enterprise model, as reflected by existing antitrust law, maximizes efficiency and
thereby lowers costs to consumers).
103
Id. at 176.

1484

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1459

The market model encourages competitors to enter markets
where supranormal profits are being earned. Under the traditional
professional paradigm, which envisioned substantial cross subsidization by hospitals, such competition was viewed pejoratively as "creamskimming." 10 4 Competitors that offered profitable services while
shunning less profitable market sectors were viewed as threats to institutions that tried to provide the services deemed appropriate even if
not economically self-supporting.
What adherence to the professional model fails to realize is that
the market model increases efficiency overall. New entry in profitable
sectors reduces prices and supranormal profits, thereby improving the
welfare of consumers who purchase and pay for the services in which
excess profits were being earned. Competition rationalizes pricing by
requiring that prices more closely reflect true resource costs. Nonself-supporting services must either find a market to sustain them or
appeal on policy grounds for direct subsidy. Marketeers view this dynamic not as "cream-skimming" but as a form of market improvement
and price rationalization.
The antitrust laws' focus on efficiency in the economic marketplace reflects the driving policy goal of consumer welfare. 10 5 In the
health care arena, this focus raises tensions because of the sensitive
equity issues lurking under the surface of the policy debates. 10 6 For
example, enhanced competition may improve the circumstances of
consumers in a particular market, but on its own, market efficiency
does not assist economically less-well-off consumers unable to pay
even at competitive prices. 10 7 Further, to the extent that cross subsidization achieves income-redistribution objectives, the elimination of
this disguised taxation requires advocates for that redistribution to
make their case more directly in the political arena. And political acceptance of redistribution may not always match the inclinations of
those in the industry who control cross-subsidization decisions.' 0 8
Thus, if cross subsidization is used to improve access to care by indigent uninsured persons, access egalitarians will be disappointed by
See Havighurst, supra note 95, at 1164-65.
But cf. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988) (focusing on competitive fairness). See generally PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRuST LAw: AN
ANALYSS OF ANTrrRusT PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1986); WILLIAM C. HoLMEs,
ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 425 (1994).
106
See Meyer & Rule, supra note 102, at 170-82.
107
See Blumstein, Public and Private Medical Resources, supra note 28, at 902-11; Blumstein, Rationing, supra note 28, at 1351-52; Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Government's Role
in Health Care, supra note 31, at 866-67.
108 See Blumstein, Public and Private Medical Resources, supra note 28, at 904; James F.
Blumstein, On the OtherHand: Some Comments on Sigelman's Palmistry, 6J. OF HEALTH POL,
POL'Y & L. 621, 621 (1982).
104

105
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policies that improve efficiency but deprive hospitals of the resources
necessary to support cross subsidization.
In the absence of specific statutory exceptions, 09 the antitrust
laws do not allow procompetitive values to be balanced against other
objectives, however worthy." 0 Under antitrust principles, courts must
examine the effect of concerted conduct on competition. A worthy
purpose is no defense to an alleged violation of the antitrust laws."'
The cultural conflict between the professional paradigm and the
antitrust laws thus becomes clear. The professional model recognizes
competition as a value that can be offset by other values, such as improved access to and quality of medical care." 2 The elimination of
the worthy purpose claim as a defense against an antitrust charge undermines the professional model's commitment to quality at any cost.
It also comes into conflict with the professional-egalitarian ideal that
money 'should not matter when it comes to the delivery of medical
services.
The antitrust laws are important both substantively and symbolically because they eliminate non-efficiency-based criteria from analytical consideration, 1 3 necessarily submerging equity concerns within
the public policy debate." 4 The risk of antitrust liability will move the
health care marketplace along the continuum toward market-oriented
policies restraining anticompetitive collective action by doctors and
institutional providers. And they provide further impetus for institutional administrators to perform the traditional management functions of cost containment and economic efficiency. They encourage
See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 & n.8 (1988).
110 See generally Thomas Greaney, Quality of Care and MarketFailureDefenses in Antitrust
Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. RErv. 605 (1989) (arguing for limited recognition of
"quality-based" factors in antitrust analysis); Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of Health
Care Cnsiderationsin Antitrust Analysis, 51 LAw & CONTEMp. PROBs. 273 (Spring 1988) (advocating role for "quality-of-care concerns" in antitrust cases in the health care field, limited by a standard of relevance).
111 See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); National Society of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Blumstein & Sloan, Hospital Peer
Review, supra note 6, at 28-32; Kauper, supra note 110, at 314-19. But see United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993); Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983).
112
This position is advanced by the American Hospital Association in advocating adoption of state laws that authorize collaborative activities among health care providers that
might otherwise violate the antitrust laws. See FredricJ. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration:
The Need For an AppropriateAntitrustPolicy, 29 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 107, 127-28, 134 (1994).
113 See Kauper, supra note 110, at 292-93 (asserting that consumer welfare model of
antitrust enforcement focuses "solely on allocative and productive efficiency," and that
"prevailing antitrust standards are largely in accord with this 'consumer welfare' model").
As Professor Kauper notes, this issue has been much debated. Id. at 93 n.82 and accompanying text. See also Meyer & Rule, supra note 102, at 172-73 & n.10 (arguing that the "signals on antitrust policy coming from the Clinton Administration have been mixed").
114 This is an explicit concern of market policy critics. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health
Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VArN. L. Ray. 1067, 1110 (1981).
109
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challenges to the traditional professional model's refusal to balance
cost and quality.
Because antitrust doctrine impels adherence to the market paradigm, it is important to strengthen the role of antitrust in the medical
care marketplace-unless it can be shown that the antitrust laws interfere with economic efficiency because of some unique and irremediable characteristic of this industry. 115
II
STATE HosPrrAL COOPERATION LAWS

16

In view of the significance of antitrust law to the emergence of
market principles in the medical care arena, it is important to consider the impact of widespread state legislation authorizing cooperation among hospitals and other health care providers. The striking
thing about such legislation is that it expressly immunizes conduct
that otherwise would violate federal antitrust law. Although the Constitution's Supremacy Clause gives primacy to federal laws that conflict
with state law, the judicially-created "state action" doctrine in the antitrust context allows states to substitute their own regulations for the
regime of competition envisioned by antitrust law. 117 The state hospital cooperation laws attempt to use the state action doctrine to confer
antitrust immunity on cooperative arrangements among health care
providers, even (or especially) if those arrangements might otherwise
run afoul of federal antitrust principles.
A.

State-conferred Immunity to the Federal Antitrust Laws: The
Parkerv. Brown State Action Doctrine

As a general principle of federalism, state laws that conflict with
or that are inconsistent with federal laws are unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 118 Federal
antitrust laws utilize the full extent of Congress' broad authority to
115 This is the precise issue upon which proponents and opponents of broad antitrust
immunity for health care provider collaboration disagree. CompareEntin et al., supra note
112, at 122-32; Meyer & Rule, supra note 102, at 170-82.
116 The term "hospital" is used for convenience. Many of the relevant statutes
encompass other health care providers. See infra notes 154-55. Colorado, Maine, Montana,
North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas require one or both parties to be hospitals or
in Montana health care facilities. The statutes of Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Washington, and Wisconsin apply to health care providers; Minnesota also includes
purchasers.
117 See James F. Blumstein & Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a
MedicalServices Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in ConstitutionalPerspectiv 1978 DuKE L.J.
389.
118
U.S. CONsT. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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regulate interstate commerce. 119 Yet, because of federalism principles, 120 the Supreme Court has held that the antitrust laws do not apply to "state action." 12 1 That is, certain state and state-approved anticompetitive private conduct is not prohibited under the federal antitrust laws.
Parker v. Brown,12 2 the case that originated the state action doctrine, considered California's restriction of competition among raisin
growers through appropriations of output designed to stabilize prices.
The California program "substitute[d] sales quotas and price control-the purest form of economic regulation-for competition in
the market for California raisins," 12 3 yet the Supreme Court found no
antitrust violation. Instead, the Court declared that the "federal antitrust laws .. . [are] subject to supersession by state regulatory pro-

grams."124 Under Parker, the federal antitrust laws do not apply "to
anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States 'as an act of government.' "125 Thus, collective efforts that would be illegal if engaged in
by private entities are permitted when conducted by the state. In ef12 6
fect, Parkerreverses the traditional rule of federal supremacy.
Parkerdrew a distinction between state action, which was not covered by the Sherman Act and was therefore effectively immune, and
state authorization of private anticompetitive conduct, which was subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act and therefore not immune. 127 Based on that distinction, Justice Stevens (for a plurality of
four justices) once argued that Parker immunity afforded no antitrust
shield at all to private defendants. 28 That position has not pre-

119
See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
For a discussion of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause of the federal
Constitution, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317

U.S. 111 (1942).
120

See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).

121
122

Id.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).

123 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2177 (1992).
125 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991).

126

This has been described as a form of "inverse preemption." Frank Easterbrook,

Antitrust and theEconomics ofFederalism, 26J.L. & ECON. 23, 25 (1983). For a critique of this

view of the Parker doctrine, see Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of AntitrustProcess, 104 HAv. L.
REv. 668 (1991).

127

317 U.S. at 351.

128 See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585-92 (1976) (Part II, concurred in
by White, Brennan, Marshall, ,., not concurred in by Burger, CJ.). Justice Stevens con-

tended that Parkerapplied only to actions against state officials in their official capacities.
Id. at 591. That position was advanced by the Solicitor General. Id, at 588-89.
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vailed, 12 9 as the Court has held that Parkerimmunity can apply to pri32
13
vate' 30 as well as governmental ' defendants.
The Supreme Court further defined the Parker doctrine in its
1980 decision in CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.133 That case identified two key elements to the Parkerimmunity analysis: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the
policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."13 4 Cases after
Midcal have further refined the analytical prongs. With respect to the
first requirement, the Supreme Court has held that a policy merely
authorizing or encouraging but not requiring anticompetitive con35
duct may qualify as "clear articulation" of state policy.'
The "active supervision" requirement serves "essentially the evidentiary function of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy." 3 6 To satisfy the "active
supervision" standard, the state must "exercise ultimate control over
the challenged anticompetitive conduct ....
The mere presence of
some state involvement or monitoring does not suffice."1 3 7 With respect to private anticompetitive conduct, "there is a real danger that
[the private party] is acting to further [its] own interests, rather than
the governmental interests of the State." 38 Actual, not just potential,' 3 9 state supervision protects the Parkerrule from abuse by private
129 See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1988) (Parkerstate-action exemption applies in suits against private parties in appropriate circumstances).
130 See, e.g, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., v. United States, 471 U.S.
48 (1985).
131 "[W]hen a state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the
State and ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws." Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567 (1984).
132 While Justice Stevens' position in Cantor did not prevail, the importance of the
original Parkerdistinction persists. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
133 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
134 Id. at 105 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978) (opinion of Brennan,J.)). The "active supervision" prong of Midcal does not apply
to conduct by municipalities. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985)
("[T]he active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the
actor is a municipality.").
135 See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
59-61 (1985).
136 See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46.
137 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
138 See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47. That contrasts with the situation where the actor
is a municipality. In such situations, "there is little or no [such] danger" and therefore no
"active supervision" requirement. Id.
139 See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2172 (1992) ("The mere potential
for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State.... In the
absence of active supervision in fact, there can be no state-action immunity for what were
otherwise private price fixing arrangements.").
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actors. 140 This means that state officials must not only have authority
but they must actually exercise that power "to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to
141
accord with state policy."
Mere passive ratification of private anticompetitive conduct will
not suffice to invoke Parkrsprotection. 142 Parker"shelter[s] only the
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties that, in the judgment
of the State, actually further state regulatory policies." 143 Further, and
importantly, those specific acts must be subject to "ongoing regulation
by the State."' 4 4
Out of deference to "principles of federalism," 145 Parker allows
state preferences for regulation to supersede the national commitment to the "preservation of the free market and of a system of free
enterprise." 46 But Parkerimmunity is "disfavored," 47 and, to satisfy
the Parkerrequirements, the "States must accept political responsibility for actions they intend to undertake." 148 Thus, the state's decision
to substitute a regime of regulation for the national policy of competition must be "implemented in its specific details"149 to assure that the
"anticompetitive scheme is the State's own." 5°
B.

State Parker-immunity Laws Authorizing Health Care Provider
Cooperation

Since 1992 eighteen states have enacted legislation that in varying
degrees allows cooperative agreements among health care providers. 15 1 The objective of this legislation is to immunize conduct that
might otherwise violate federal antitrust laws. The legislation is based
See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101; Tico, 112 S. Ct. at 2172.
Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 ("The active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires
that state officials have and exercise" such power.).
142 Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177. See also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01.
143 Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177.
144 Id.
145
Id.
146
Id at 2176.
147 Id. at 2178.
148 I&
149 Id. at 2176.
150 I& at 2177.
151
COLO. REy. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2701 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.606 (West
1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-72 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 39-4901 (1994); 1994 KAN. SEAsS.
LAws 153; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-468 (1992); ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1881 (West
1993); MmN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2911 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-601 (1933);
(1993); 1994 NEB. Lxws 1223; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2950 (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 131E-192 (1993); N.D. CErr. CODE § 23-17.5-01 (1993); OHio Ray. CODE ANN.
§ 3727.21 (Baldwin 1993); OR- Ray. STAT. § 442.700 (1994); TENN. CODE AmN.§ 68-11-1301
(1993); TEx. HALm & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.001 (West 1994); WASH. Ray. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.44.450, 43.72.300 (West 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.84 (West 1993). See supra note
15.
140
141
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on the premise that in the health care marketplace regulation may be
preferable to competition in some circumstances.
Some states have followed what appears to be a legislative
model1 52 while others have struck out on their own. 153 However,
there are similarities in purpose and procedure in all of them. Generally speaking, the statutes allow hospitals,15 4 or more broadly health
care providers, 155 to enter into cooperative agreements if the likely
benefits outweigh the disadvantages attributable to a reduction in
competition. 15 6 These state hospital cooperation laws overcome market-oriented strategies by invoking the protection of the Parker
doctrine.
Procedurally, hospitals or health care providers apply for a certificate of public advantage by submitting the agreement and explanatory materials to the department of health and to the state attorney
general. 157 The department reviews the agreement and may hold a
The first listed statutes for Kansas and Washington apply only to cooperative agreements among rural public hospitals; the second statutes apply more broadly. The New
York and Florida statutes are limited to rural areas; the Georgia statute allows hospital
authorities within the same county to consolidate. The Oregon provision covers only heart
and kidney transplants.
152 The states that appear to follow a legislative model are Idaho, Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. See supranote 151. Even within this

group, however, the differences between the Wisconsin law, the most abbreviated, and the
North Carolina law, the most detailed, are significant.
153
See, for example, the statutes adopted in Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio
and Washington. See supra note 151.
154
Maine, Montana, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas allow cooperative agreements
among two or more hospitals. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1882(1) (West 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-601 (1993) (health care facilities); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3727.21 (Baldwin 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1302(2) (1993); TEx. HEALTH &
SAs-rv CODE ANN. § 313.001(2) (West 1994). Colorado and North Carolina allow cooperative agreements when at least one party is a hospital. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-322703(2) (West 1993); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 131E-192.2.(2) (1993).
155 The statutes in the following states apply to health care providers: Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See IDAHO CODE § 39-4902(1) (1994);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2913 subd. 1 (West 1994) (providers and purchasers); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-17.5-01(1) (1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.72.310(1) (West 1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 150.84(1) (West 1993).
156
IDAHO CODE § 39-4903 (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(1) (West 1993);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-17.5-02 (1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3727.22(B) (Baldwin 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303 (1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN § 313.002(a)
(West 1994); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85 (4) (a) (1) (West 1993). The statutes of other

states include a legislative finding or statement of purpose that regulation should supplant
competition. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2702(1)-(4) (West 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 62J.2911 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-601 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131E-192.1 (1993); and WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.72.300(2) (West 1994).
157
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2705(1) (West 1993); IDAHO CODE § 394903 (1944) (but only to the attorney general); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(2)
(West 1993); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2913 subd. 1 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4603 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.3(b) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-17.5-02
(1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3727.22 (Baldwin 1993) (submission to the attorney general only after health department approval); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(b) (1993);"
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public hearing.15 8 In states following the legislative model, the applicants must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
likely benefits resulting from the agreement outweigh any disadvan159
tages attributable to a reduction in competition.
The health department considers whether the following benefits
may result: (1) enhancement of quality of care to hospital patients,
(2) preservation of hospital facilities in geographic proximity to communities, (3) gains in cost efficiency, (4) improvements in utilization
of hospital resources and equipment, and (5) avoidance of duplication of resources. 160 The department also evaluates any disadvantages
including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the adverse impact on
the ability of HMOs, PPOs or other payors to negotiate optimal payment and service arrangements with hospitals and physicians, (2) the
extent of any reduction in competition among physicians or others
likely to result from the agreement, (3) the extent of any likely adverse impact on patients in the quality, availability, and price of health
313.002(b) (West 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 43.72.310(3) (West 1994) (after prior submission to the attorney general); and Wis.
STAT. ANN.§ 150.85(2) (West 1993) (submission only to the department of health).
158 A hearing is required in Montana, North Carolina, and North Dakota. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-4-603(2) (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.4(b) (1993); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-17.5-02 (1993). A hearing is optional in Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Tennessee,
and Texas, but public notice is required in Minnesota. See IDAHO CODE § 39-4903(3)
(1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(3) (West 1993); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2914
subd. 2, § 62J.2916 (West 1994); TENN.CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(c) (1993); TEx. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(c) (West 1994). Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin have no
provisions for a hearing-, in Wisconsin the application is approved unless it is denied within
30 days of receiving it. SeeWis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(3) (a) (West 1993). In Colorado regulations shall require a public hearing. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2705 (West 1993).
159 See IDAHO CODE § 39.4903(4) (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(4) (West
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.4(b) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-17.5-03 (1993);
TEN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(d) (1993); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(d)
(West 1994). Wisconsin does not use a clear and convincing standard. SeeWis. STAT. ANN.
§ 150.85(4) (a) (1) (West 1993). The states that do not follow the model do not use a clear
and convincing standard. The analysis is whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the
disadvantages associated with the reduction in competition. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-322706(1) (1993); MINN. STAT ANN. § 62J.2917 Subd. 1 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50TEX. HEALTH & SAF=lY CODE ANN. §

4-603 (1993); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3727.22(B) (Baldwin 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 43.72.310(3) (West 1994).
160 See IDAHO CODE § 39.4903(5) (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(4) (A)
(West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.4(b) (1993) (also includes the extent to which
medically underserved populations are expected to use the services); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-17.5-03(1) (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(d)(1) (1993); TEx. HEALTH &
SA=mY CODE ANN. § 313.002(e) (West 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.72.310(4) (West
1994) (does not include preserving facilities but does include facilitating information exchange); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85(4) (b) (West 1993). Except for Washington, the states
that do not follow the model do not include the list of benefits enumerated in the text.
While Colorado has a long list, in general the benefits can be summarized as reduced costs,
improved quality and improved access. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2706(2) (West
1993); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2917 Subd. 2 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-603(2)

(1993); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3727.21(A) (Baldwin 1993).
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care services, and (4) the availability of arrangements that are less re16 1
strictive to competition to achieve the desired benefits.
In about half of the states the department is required to consult
with the attorney general. 162 Subsequent to approval, the department
may terminate the certificate, the state attorney general may initiate
an investigation, or both. 16 3 Some statutes provide directly for immunity from antitrust if a cooperative agreement is approved. Other statutes provide that an agreement which is granted a certificate of public
advantage is lawful and the conduct of the parties in negotiating that
agreement is lawful.'6 Hospital mergers are exempted from the pro161

See IDAHO CODE

§ 39.4903(5) (1994);

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

22, § 1883(4) (B)

(West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.4(b) (1993) (also includes increases in costs at

the hospitals party to the agreement and reduction in competition among the parties as
criteria); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-17.5-03(2) (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(d) (2)
(1993); Tax. HALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(f) (West 1994); WAsH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 43.73.310(4) (West 1994) (combines criteria (1) and (2) listed in text); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 150.85(4) (c) (West 1993) (adverse-impact-on-patients criterion not included). Except for Washington, the states that do not follow the model do not have a list of disadvantages to be considered other than the disadvantages associated with a reduction in
competition; Minnesota lists factors to be considered, some of which are disadvantages. See
MINN. STAT. § 62J.2917 subd. 2(a)(6), 2(b)(3), (4), (9) (West 1994).
162
See IDAHO CODE § 39.4903(4) (1994); ME. REy. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(5) (West
1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(e) (West 1993); Tax. HEALTH & SAFarY CODE ANN.
§ 313.002(g) (West 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.72.310(1), (4) (West 1994). Colorado, North Carolina, and North Dakota do not require such consultation, but the attorney general is sent a copy when the application is filed. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-322705(1) (West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.3(b) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-17.502 (1993). The Montana and Wisconsin statutes do not involve the attorney general. In
Minnesota, the attorney general may appear as a party in a contested case. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 62J.2916 subd. 2(c) (West 1994). In Ohio, if the health department approves the
agreement, it is then sent to the attorney general for approval or denial. See OHIO REV.
STAT. ANN. § 3727.22 (Baldwin 1993).
163
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2702 (West 1993); IDAHO CODE § 394903(12) (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(6) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62J.2921 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-609 (1993); OHIO R v. CODE ANN.
§ 3727.22(E), (F) (Baldwin 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.8 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-17.5-04 (1993); WAsH Ray. CODE ANN. § 43.72.310(6) (West 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 150.85(5) (West 1993). Some states require a showing of changed circumstances for the
attorney general to bring suit. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1885(5) (West 1993); N.D.
CENT. CoDE § 23-17.5-08 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1305(e) (1993); Tax. HEALTH &
SAFaT' CODE ANN. § 313.003(e) (West 1994). In Texas, not only the attorney general but
also the health department must show changed circumstances. Tax. HEALTH & SAFMY
CODE ANN. § 313.004(a) (West 1994).
164
The following states use immunity language or state that approval is a defense to
antitrust laws: Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, and Ohio. See
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2712(1) (West 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-4903(7), (10)
(1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2913 subd. 2 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-601
(1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.13 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE § 3727.21 (Baldwin 1993).
Washington states that conduct so authorized is taken pursuant to state statute. See WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 43.72.310(5) (West 1994). The following states use lawful agreement
and lawful conduct language: Maine, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. See ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1886(1) (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-17.5-10 (1993); TENN.
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tection of the statute in some states.1 65 There are few provisions requiring ongoing supervision by the department of health or the
attorney general of actions taken by parties under the terms of a coop1 66
erative agreement.
1.

The Rationalefor State Hospital CooperationLaws: Economic'
Efficiency

One purported justification for hospital cooperation legislation is
economic efficiency. This is an ironic claim because the very heart
and soul of antitrust law is its furtherance of competition in the name
of economic efficiency. 167 Because their premise is that regulation
rather than competition will achieve efficiency in the health care marketplace, these laws strike at the heart of the debate about the role of
the market paradigm in medical care.'6 8
A regulatory regime, by substituting political oversight for market
principles, arguably could achieve economic efficiency. The central
premise of the antitrust laws, however, is that markets are presumed to
be better at achieving efficiency objectives than are the commandand-control political processes inherent in regulation. Surely, in an
economy dominated by reliance on markets to achieve the efficient
allocation of resources, it is appropriate to place the burden ofjustification on those who favor a regulatory agenda over market principles
in a specific industry or sector of the economy.169
CODE ANN.

§ 68-11-1306 (1993); TFX. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE ANN.

§ 313.006(a) (West

1994).
165
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1886(4) (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2317.5-10 (1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFTY CODE ANN. § 313.007 (West 1994). Mergers are not
expressly excluded from coverage in Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio,
Tennessee, Washington, or Wisconsin.
166
Colorado provides that rules shall require reports. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2432-2708 (West 1993). In Idaho the attorney general may request periodic reports. See
IDAHO CODE § 39-4903(8) (1994). Minnesota requires periodic reports. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 62J.2918 subd. 3, § 62J.2920 (West 1994). North Carolina requires reports every
two years. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.9 (1993). Ohio may request updated information and provide supervision by the health department and the attorney general. See OHIO
Rv. STAT. ANN. § 3727.24 (Baldwin 1993). In Tennessee, the health department and the
attorney general are entrusted with the oversight of cooperative agreements but no procedures are set forth. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(b) (1993). In Texas, the health
department may request documents and may terminate the arrangement. See TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004 (West 1994). Washington requires active supervision and periodic reports. SeeWASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.72.310(6) (West 1994). Maine,
North Dakota, and Wisconsin only have termination or revocation procedures. See ME.
REv. STAT. Am. tit. 22, §§ 1883(6), 1885(5) (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-17.5-04, 08 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85 (5) (a) (West 1993).
167 See supra note 113.
168
See Meyer & Rule, supra note 102, at 176-82.
169
See James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Planningand Regulation Through
Certificate ofNeed: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. Ray. 3, 3 ("In a nation whose institutions have
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Part of the health care reform agenda is the goal of rationalizing
the health care marketplace to make it function more like other economic sectors. As described earlier, the health care industry has a
history of resistance to market-based principles. Antitrust law, among
other policies, has contributed to a shift toward greater reliance on
market principles. Regulation in the name of economic efficiency
smacks of an earlier era in which health planning was promoted as a
means of rationalizing the health care delivery system. 170 That is, the
policy reflects a resistance to the shift in paradigms; it assumes that
the features of the health care marketplace that impede the proper
functioning of the market will remain in place and that regulation is
the appropriate means to cope with that market-resistant pattern.
The literature supporting hospital cooperation legislation suggests that competition among hospitals can result in wasteful practices. The argument is that institutional arrangements in the health
care marketplace cause 17 1 competition to benefit certain groups (such
as providers) 172 at the expense of consumers. 173 Studies also show,
however, that modifications of payment, purchasing practices, and
other institutional arrangements, which allow incentives to operate as
relied on market mechanisms for making basic economic choices, governmental imposition of planning bears a burden of persuasion.") [hereinafter Health Planning].
170
See id. at 3-7; Havighurst, supra note 95, at 1148-52. See also James F. Blumstein,
Effective Health Planning in a Competitive Environmen in CosT, QUALIY, AND ACCESS IN
HEALTH CARE: NEw RoLEs FOR HEALTH PLANNING IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 21

(Frank A. Sloan etal. eds., 1988); Randall Bovbjerg, New Directionsfor Health Planning,in id.
at 206.
171 Illustrations are the prevalence of third-party payment, the extensive role of nonprofit institutions, the presence of the government as payor (Medicaid and Medicare), and
the JCAHO requirement of an independent hospital medical staff.
172 See Clark, supranote 77; Philip C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and HospitalPrivileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REy. 595, 651-55 (1982).
173 See, e.g., James C. Robinson, The Impact of HospitalMarket Structure on PatientVolume,
Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care 4J. HEALTH ECON. 333, 353-54 (1985) (evaluating
data from 1972 for 5000 community hospitals and finding that hospitals in more competitive local markets manifested significantly higher average costs per case and per day than
hospitals in less competitive areas); Harold S. Luft et al., The Role of Specialized Clinical Services in Competition Among Hospitals, 23 INQUIRY 83, 93 (1986) (using 1972 data, finding that
competition to offer clinical services led to the proliferation of such services, cost inflation,
and possibly low surgical volumes and poor surgical outcomes);James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA 3241, 3244
(1987) (attributing higher costs to more competitive markets; consistent with the "medical
arms race" hypothesis, competition in the hospital sector took the form of cost-increasing
acquisition of new technology rather than changes in efficiency); Wayne Higgins, Myths of
Competitive Reform, 16 HEALTH CARE MGMT. Rav. 65, 69 (1991) (discount contracting in
parts of California and in Minneapolis-St. Paul slowed the rate of hospital cost inflation but
nonprice competition tends to increase rather than decrease costs); Nguyen Xuan Nguyen
& Frederick W. Derrick, HospitalMarkets and Competition: Implicationsfor Antitrust Policy, 19
HEALTH CARE MGcrr. REa. 34, 40-41 (1994) (associating increased hospital competition
with higher costs, lower occupancy rates, reduced efficiency, and more service offerings;
maintaining lower market concentration through antitrust enforcement risks encouraging
nonprice competition and increased hospital expenditures).
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in a more traditional market, have countered this negative
phenomenon. 174
Advocates of health care reform who emphasize the importance
of the market paradigm would agree with the diagnosis of these studies-that structural preconditions are key to a successful market.
That means encouraging different forms of payment and different
structures for the purchasing of medical care services. As costs have
escalated, consumers and payors have begun paying more attention to
these issues. 175 Institutional change is a prerequisite to and part of
the agenda of market-based reform. Continued rational enforcement
176
of the antitrust laws can only benefit the reformist agenda.
From that perspective, the state-based hospital cooperation laws
seem counter revolutionary (or at least counter evolutionary). Instead of pursuing a structural reform agenda, which would improve
the ability of the market to perform its appropriate resource-allocation function, these laws construct (or reconstruct) a regulatory regime that could frustrate the development of market-based structures
and a market-oriented culture in the industry. It could also reinforce
the historical professional dominance at the expense of consumer
174 See, e.g., David Dranove et al., Price and Concentrationin HospitalMarkets: The Switch
from Patient-Drivento Payer-Driven Competition, 36J.L. & ECON. 179, 180-81 (1993) (analyzing
data from California showing that shifts in purchasing power from patients and physicians
to insurers reduce profit margins; in response to lower margins, hospitals shifted to highermargin services and more distinctive services); Glenn A. Melnick &Jack Zwanziger, Hospital
Behavior under Competition and Cost-Containment Policies: The California Experience, 1980 to
1985, 260JAMA 2669, 2675 (1988) (studying data from California that showed that following the shift from cost-based reimbursement to market price-based contracting, hospitals
in the most competitive markets experienced slower cost escalation when compared to
hospitals in less competitive markets);James C. Robinson, HMO MarketPenetrationand Hospital Cost Inflation in California, 266JAMA 2719, 2723 (1991) (identifying indirect effects of
HMOs on hospital behavior in the form of more price-competitive behavior, only when
health insurance plans are permitted to contract with hospitals on the basis of price can
HMO market penetration reduce hospital cost inflation); Jack Zwanziger et al., Costs and
Price Competition in CaliforniaHospitals,1980-1990, 13 HEALTH AFF. 118 (Fall 1994) (studying
data from California from 1980 to 1990 which demonstrates that selective contracting by
insurers and HMOs reduced the rate. of growth of hospital revenues and costs in competitive hospital markets) ;Jack Zwanziger & Glenn A. Melnick, TheEffects of HospitalCompetition
and the Medicare PPSProgram on Hospital Cost Behavior in Calfornia 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 301,
316 (1988) (concluding that after California implemented selective contracting in 1983,
the nature of hospital competition underwent a structural change and increasingly hospitals competed on a price basis).
175 See, e.g., Dan Morgan, The Rise of CorporateMedicine: The 'Managed Care' Bandwagon
is Running TraditionalPractices Off the Road,WASH. Posr NAT'L WKL. EDrrmON, June 20-26,
1994, at 6; Dan Morgan, Squeezing the Specialists: HMOs and other 'Managed Care' Plans are
ChangingHow They PracticeMedicine,WASH. Posr NAT'L WKLY. EorrToN, July 25-31, 1994, at
10; George Anders & Hilary Stout, Dose of Reform: As Clinton Plan Falters, Health Care Is
Shaped by the Private Sector, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1994, at Al; While Congress Remains Silent,
Health Care Transforms Itself, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1994.
176 See Meyer & Rule, supra note 102, at 171 (arguing that the "federal antitrust laws, as
... sensibly enforced, provide a great degree of flexibility for private collaborative efforts
aimed at achieving more efficient and less costly delivery of health care service").
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choice and empowerment. These laws might even be labeled
revanchist.
Another way of looking at state-based hospital cooperation laws,
at least to the extent that they seek to achieve efficiency objectives, is
that they are not regulatory in character and reflect no revanchist hostility to a market model for the health care industry. Instead, one
might argue that these laws are a response to provider perceptions
that federal antitrust policy is being administered poorly. 177 Providers
may see federal antitrust enforcement officials as insufficiently versed
in the nuances and peculiarities of the industry. Viewed in this way,
state hospital cooperation laws may represent an attempt to achieve
more sophisticated procompetitive policies. They do not pose a challenge to the market paradigm; rather, it might be argued, they challenge the techniques and standards of antitrust enforcement. 178
Securing a proper understanding of what policies promote economic efficiency is critical to the appropriate enforcement of the antitrust laws. In theory, at least, cooperation that fosters efficiency can
coexist peacefully with the procompetitive antitrust laws. 179 Perhaps
states view antitrust enforcement as an obstacle to ventures that promote economic efficiency. Since Parkerimmunity allows states to substitute their own enforcement procedures for federal antitrust agency
enforcement mechanisms, 8 0 states may argue that hospital cooperation laws are simply the manifestations of federalism in a specialized
industry that is not well suited to federal agency intervention.
Such a rationale for state hospital cooperation laws would not
challenge the fundamental role of the market model in the health
care arena, but would substitute one enforcement entity (state health
departments) for another (federal antitrust enforcement agencies).
This justification for state hospital cooperation legislation is not at
177 See Letter from FredricJ. Entin, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, American Hospital Association, to Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust),
United States Department ofJustice (Jan. 28, 1994).
178
There has been considerable concern about how product and geographic markets
are to be defined in the hospital context. See, e.g., James M. Klingensmith, Applying Antitrust Concepts to the Acute Care HospitalIndustry: Defining the Relevant Marketfor HospitalServices, 13 J. HEmTH POL., POL'Y & L. 153 (1988); Michael A. Morrisey et al., Defining
GeographicMarkets for Hospital Care 51 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 165 (Spring 1988); Jack
Zwanziger, Editoriak Antitrust Considerations and HospitalMarkets, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 457
(1989);Jack Zwanziger et al., Hospitals and Antitrust: Defining Markets, Setting Standards,19
J. HEALTrH POL., POL'Y & L. 423 (1994). For relevant case law, see Hospital Corp. of Am. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,301 (FTC Oct. 25, 1985), aff'd, 807
F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). Compare United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va.), aff'd without opinion, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. ll. 1989), aff'd,
898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
179 See supra note 176.
180 See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
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odds with the health care reform goal of promoting market-oriented
policies. Consistent with that rationale, proponents of hospital cooperation laws could argue that, unlike command-and-control regulatory
programs, such laws neither prohibit private conduct nor bar access to
the market. Failure of a private party to seek or secure state approval
under the hospital cooperation laws leaves the private party in the
same position that party would be in if the legislation did not exist.
At the same time, entities that obtain approval are secure from
what is perceived as unsophisticated or misguided federal antitrust enforcement. From this perspective, the state reviewing agency must act
as a surrogate for the federal antitrust authorities, applying the same
set of economic criteria-economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
The state reviewing entities are typically health departments, which, at
least arguably, are more attuned to local market realities. That is, they
are in a better position to assess these factors. The state structure,
then, would safeguard in-state actors from inappropriate antitrust enforcement while properly weighing at the state level the procompetitive and anticompetitive dimensions of the particular conduct at issue.
This rationale for state hospital cooperation laws, unfortunately,
appears to be somewhat of a construct, since these laws typically allow
state reviewing authorities to consider factors other than economic
efficiency.'"' Further, there is a reasonable question whether state
health departments are likely to be as institutionally sensitive to concerns regarding competition, especially when many in the health care
industry have been taught that competitive principles should play at
182
most an attenuated role in the health care marketplace.
181
Tennessee's statute, which is typical of those states that follow a legislative model,
provides for consideration of: (A) enhancement of the quality of hospital care; (B) preservation of hospital facilities; (C) gains in the cost efficiency of services provided; (D) improved utilization of hospital resources; and (E) avoidance of duplication of hospital
resources. Quality and preservation of facilities are not efficiency factors while cost efficiency and avoidance of duplication are. Preservation of facilities is not limited necessarily
to rural areas and thus may relate to preserving all existing facilities. Improved utilization
is ambiguous since it could refer to the elimination of underutilized services, or it could
mean improving utilization by promoting greater use, thus spreading the cost over more
patients. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(1) (1993). North Carolina includes an additional consideration: the extent to which medically underserved populations are expected
to utilize the proposed services. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.4(b) (1993). Minnesota's list
of relevant factors includes the extent to which the proposed arrangement is likely to make
health care services or products more financially or geographically available to persons
who need them. This is an equity rather than an efficiency issue. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62J.2917 subd. 2(c)(3) (West 1994).
182
The states' records on regulation, as reflected in statistics on the administration of
certificate-of-need laws, is not reassuring. See, e.g., Blumstein & Sloan, Health Planning
supra note 169, at 19-30. Further, there is a generic problem of regulatory capture, in
which "regulatory agencies.., actively retard desirable changes harmful to the regulated
interests." Havighurst, supra note 95, at 1204. Thus, the realistic and legitimate concern is
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In any event, it is far from clear that the claim of poor administration by federal antitrust enforcers is accurate. 183 In view of the importance of antitrust law in transforming the operation and culture of the
health care industry, it is appropriate for market-oriented health care
reformers to remain skeptical about the efficiency-based rationale for
state hospital cooperation legislation. After all, there is a nontrivial
risk that, despite some overcapacity in the industry, supply-side constraints may increase scarcity and thereby promote both an upward
movement of prices and greater economic leverage on the part of
health care providers.
On theoretical grounds, antitrust enforcement promotes competition and therefore economic efficiency. To the extent that institutional characteristics of the industry impede the use of marketoriented policies, health care reformers should strive to force institutional change so that traditional economic principles have more direct application. Research studies support the conclusion that shifts
in incentives, such as changes in payment methods, effect appropriate
competitive responses. 8 4 The efficiency-based claim for state hospital
cooperation legislation would thus seem unproven.
2.

The Rationalefor State Hospital Cooperation Laws: Cross
Subsidization

The more plausible rationale for state hospital cooperation laws
is not that they are designed to promote economic efficiency but that
they represent a provider/access egalitarian response to the consequences of increased competition in the health care industry. The
predictable effect of increased competition is the competing away of
supranormal returns by health care providers. 18 5 This in turn reduces
the availability of funds for cross subsidization, through which providers transfer rents from one segment of the market to pay for worthy
purposes such as specialized services, medical education, or better access for impecunious patients.
Under the market paradigm, economic efficiency is the goal pursued. Antitrust law enforces the norm of competition in order to promote consumer welfare. To the extent that such procompetitive
policies keep prices at competitive levels, consumers benefit. Consumers with fewer resources clearly benefit because of the lower prices
associated with competitive processes. Nonetheless, efficiency-orithat "[ilf the hospital industry becomes subject to exogenous threats or pressures, its regulators could be expected to afford it aid and protection." I. at 1205.
183 See generally Meyer & Rule, supra note 102. See also Health Care Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 9. But see Entin, supra note 177; Entin et al., supra note 112.
184
See supra note 174.

185

See Phelps, supra note 90, at 121-22; see also MomusEv, supranote 91, at 71-72.
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ented policy "does not directly address the question of equity of access." 186 It "makes no specific claim about the proper eligibility
criteria or level of medical services that society should provide to worthy and needy persons." 18 7 That is, it "takes no position on what degree of redistributive munificence is proper in the medical services
8
field."l
Thus, to the extent that redistributive goals are part of the health
care reform agenda, a program that relies on enhancing efficiency
alone may not achieve those goals. Additional resources likely will be
needed to improve access for the poor or to develop specialized,
expensive services. Traditionally, such additional resources have
come from cross subsidization, which requires supranormal returns in
some areas to allow transfer to other areas. The absence or reduction
of additional funds makes that policy of cross subsidization difficult to
achieve.
Assuring a continued flow of monopoly rents for achieving worthy purposes through cross subsidization is perhaps the most plausible
policy explanation for the state hospital cooperation legislation, despite statutory language emphasizing efficiency. The statutes explicitly permit consideration of substantive policy goals such as improved
access. 18 9 The provisions call for a balancing, in a legal-administrative
setting, of efficiency objectives with ill defined, nonprioritized, and
unweighted equity objectives. That type of balancing is beyond the
appropriate purview of an antitrust court or enforcement authority. It
is reasonable to question whether, in a legal-administrative proceeding, such an intensely political process can be carried out fairly or
effectively.
The achievement of access and other political health care reform
objectives is certainly a legitimate policy goal for states to pursue. The
degree of income or wealth redistribution to be achieved is a quintessential political matter. The problem has been that advocates for increased access-more income redistribution-are much more able to
persuade political actors in the abstract of the justice and the wisdom
of broader coverage than they are in the practical world of nitty gritty
policymaking detail. The devil that lurks in the details is the need to
pay for this redistributive munificence, whether through taxes or
some hidden form of income generation and transfer. The state hospital cooperation legislation may well represent an effort to return to
this type of hidden subsidy by regulation-a response to competitive
186

See Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health Care, supranote 31, at

867.
187
188

189

Id.
Id.
See supra note 181.
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pressures that have reduced supracompetitive rents previously available for cross subsidization.
The historical problem for access egalitarian redistributionists
has been the mismatch between their ambitious goals and the willingness of political actors (voters and their representatives) to acquiesce
openly and directly in such ambitious transfer programs. The initial
health care reform program proposed by the Clinton Administration
is a good illustration of the hidden subsidy approach to reform. The
proposal featured little in the way of direct taxation. 190 The employer
mandates were a camouflaged form of taxation, but the in-kind transfers were the heart of the program. The eighty-five percent of the
population with health insurance would be lumped together in health
alliances with the uninsured, all receiving the same "comprehensive"
benefits package. Global cost controls would restrain aggregate expenditures for both those currently with and without insurance.
While some efficiencies would undoubtedly accrue, the basic game
plan was to spread existing health care dollars over more beneficiaries. To the extent that enhanced efficiencies could not make up
for this extra burden on the system, the eighty-five percent of the population currently insured would receive lower quality services. National health insurance in this sense represented a hidden in-kind
income transfer program, which, when uncovered and made more explicit, lost much of its political appeal.
The use of regulatory programs to confer monopoly rents for
transfer is a throwback to the old way of doing things in the health
care arena. It is a program of political obfuscation that Richard Posner many years ago characterized as "taxation by regulation." 9 1
The coalition of access egalitarian redistributionists and health
care providers has been a potent one in the political history of health
care reform.' 9 2 Hospital cooperation legislation would seem to empower states to substitute regulation for competition and to build in
supracompetitive rents for worthy cross-subsidizing objectives. That
type of subsidization system makes accountability difficult because
true costs are disguised. Policymakers consciously may choose to hide
such objectives on the theory that "[a] society that embraces a market
approach to most of its daily economic life, including.., health care,
is unlikely to redistribute adequate purchasing power to people in
economic need."' 9 3 By contrast, "market advocates argue.., that in
190 See Blumstein, Preliminaiy Thoughts, supra note 8, at 202-03 ("Much of the complexity and comprehensiveness of the plan stems from the desire to finance expanded access

without putting more money on the table.").
191 Richard Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT.Scl. 22 (1971).
192
See supra note 24.
193 Rosenblatt, supra note 114, at 1110.
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almost all areas of economic life, the government's appropriate role is
first to 'make markets work competitively,' and then to supply the
poorest people with redistributed purchasing power-if that is seen as
1 94
politically desirable."
While the reinvigoration of cross subsidization through regulation may achieve access egalitarian or provider-protection objectives,
or a combination of both, those goals may well be achieved at the
expense of the benefits of vibrant competition. Yet, proponents of the
legislation are quite correct that balancing of efficiency with other
goals is inconsistent with antitrust principles. Worthy goals should be
achieved openly and directly through the political process, through
overt subsidization, and without the market-distorting effects of hidden taxation and the supersession of federal antitrust law.
These state laws are still relatively new and their impact untested.
The degree of re-regulation is therefore still unclear. The question
arises as to the nature and degree of regulatory oversight necessary for
these statutes successfully to confer Parkerimmunity on the private
parties whose conduct is involved.
C.

ParkerImmunity: The Need for Active Supervision

In order for its regulatory scheme successfully to immunize private actors from the antitrust laws, a state must clearly articulate its
policy to substitute regulation for competition' 95 and it must actively
supervise19 6-i.e.,
affirmatively approve or disapprove' 97-the "spe9
8
cific details"' of the "particular anticompetitive acts of private parties" 199 to assure that the "anticompetitive scheme is the State's
own."

200

A number of the hospital cooperation statutes express the requisite intent explicitly,2 0 1 while others do so more implicity.2 0 2 How194

195

Id. at 1109 (citation omitted).
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105

(1980).
196 Id.
197 See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (The state must "review particular
anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail
to accord with state
policy.").
198 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S.Ct. 2169, 2176 (1992).
199 Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
200 Ticor, 112 S.Ct. at 2177.
201 Several states have a statement of legislative purpose or a legislative finding to the
effect that competition should be supplanted by a regulatory program. See CoLo. Rav.
STAT. ANN.§ 24-32-2702 (1)-(4) (West 1993); MiNN.STAT. ANN. § 62J.2911 (West 1994);
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 50-4-601 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.1 (1993); and WAsH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 4372.300(2) (West 1994).
202 Statutes such as Tennessee's provide that "[a] hospital may negotiate and enter
into cooperative agreements with other hospitals in the state if the likely benefits resulting
from the agreements outweigh any disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competi-
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ever, all hospital cooperation laws are designed to take advantage of
Parker immunity for private conduct in the medical marketplace.
Therefore, the clear articulation prong of the Midcalstandard should
20 3
pose no insuperable obstacle.
The "active supervision" component of Midcal poses a more interesting and formidable challenge. Two Supreme Court cases, Patrickv.
Burget20 4 and FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 20 5 have made it clear that
the private conduct immunized under the Parkerstate-action doctrine
must reflect and be consistent with articulated state policies. Passive
ratification of privately initiated anticompetitive conduct will not satisfy the requirements for immunity. The federalism rationale undergirding Parker assigns political accountability to state officials. If a
system of regulation at odds with federal procompetitive antitrust policies is to be given effect, state officials must bear direct and visible
political responsibility. 20 6 That is, the state policy, for which private
conduct is immunized, must be "implemented in its specific details,"207 not at a highly general or abstract level. The key is that the

state must "exercise [ sufficient independent judgment and control
so that the details.., have been established as a product of deliberate
20 8
state intervention."
What the "active supervision" requirement means is that serious,
ongoing state involvement in the nitty gritty of decisionmaking will be
a prerequisite to successful conferral of Parkerimmunity. Ticor makes
it clear that the degree of actual state involvement will be scrutinized
when private conduct is challenged under the antitrust laws. The
strictness of the active supervision requirement means that hospitals
should not expect "sweetheart" arrangements with state regulators.
Although state policies antithetical to the federal antitrust laws can
obtain Parker immunity, private conduct largely engaged in without
the affirmative and ongoing imprimatur of the state will not be
shielded.
In practical terms, then, the price of securing Parkerimmunity for
hospitals may be quite substantial, entailing detailed procedural and
don." TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1301(a) (1993). See also IDAHO CODE § 39-4903 (1994);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(4) (West 1993); N.D. CENT.CODE § 23-17.5-02 (1993);
OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 3727.22(B) (Baldwin 1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAIETY CODE ANN.
§ 313.002(a) (West 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85 (4)(a)(1) (West 1993).
203 See Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-SanctionedProviderCollaborationafter Ticor, 62
ANTrrrUsT LJ. 409, 421-23 (1994).
204 486 U.S. 94, 102 (1988) ("The State does not actively supervise... unless a state
official has and exercises ultimate authority, over private" conduct.).
205 112 S.Ct. 2169, 2176 (1992) ("Actual state involvement.., is the precondition for
immunity from federal law.").
206 Id. at 2178.
207 Id. at 2176.
208 Id. at 2171.
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substantive review with all the associated transaction costs and the potential loss of considerable decisionmaking autonomy. If these laws
are going to work on behalf of hospitals, they cannot be shams. The
states must actually confront and affirmatively decide the difficult efficiency and nonefficiency questions. Presumably, to satisfy the "active
supervision" standard, state health departments must develop and apply criteria for measuring costs and benefits to demonstrate that they
have reached ajudgment as a matter of state policy-that they are not
rubber stamping the decisions of the petitioning hospitals. To the
extent that Ticor requires states to act affirmatively and in good faith
to insure that these decisions are state decisions, proponents of this
legislation may be disappointed. This fact suggests that the statutes
will not be used routinely by hospitals but will serve as backup alternatives when hospitals are faced with a threat from a federal enforce20
ment agency.

9

Perhaps the most important question in light of Ticor is whether
"active supervision" requires ongoing monitoring of private conduct
by state agencies. Where cooperative relationships have an ongoing
and potentially damaging effect on competition, Ticor seems to man209 The Minnesota Commission of Health approved the merger of two hospital systems
involving seven hospitals located in the greater Minneapolis and Saint Paul areas. The
Minnesota Attorney General raised antitrust objections and reached agreement with the
applicant regarding terms and conditions relating to the transaction. The Commissioner
found that the merger would result in cost savings to the applicant of about $30 million,
most of which would be passed through to the users of the hospitals. This was shown
through affidavits from major purchasers of health care services in the area. These affidavits indicated that through their contract negotiations with the hospitals, savings had been
passed on to them. Additionally, no purchasers filed negative comments regarding the
merger. The affidavits also gave weight to the argument that even post merger, the market
was still competitive. Furthermore, the agreement with the Attorney General placed more
stringent limits on revenue growth for some of the hospitals than required by statute. The
Commission found no evidence of geographic or financial limitation to health care services that exist or a lessening of the quality of care as a result of the merger. As a part of
ongoing supervision, the Commission required periodic reports regarding quality of care,
a three-year prohibition against certain mergers, review before exclusive contracting, and
an independent auditor to see that growth limits were actually achieved. Findings of Fact,
Conclusions, Order and Memorandum issued by Minnesota Commission of Health, In re
Application of HealthSpan Health Systems Corporation (July 22, 1994).
Three other states have used their provider cooperation process. Maine has approved
an agreement among three hospitals for the joint operation of a magnetic resonance imaging machine; Oregon has approved ajoint kidney transplant program between two hospitals; and Washington has allowed eight rural hospitals to send nonemergency laboratory
work to a central laboratory. See GAO Repor4 supra note 15, at 11.
The extensiveness and thoroughness of the Minnesota decision suggest that, at least in
such major matters, a state-based process can carefully evaluate the factors enumerated in
the statute for consideration. At the same time, the costs of undergoing such a process are
considerable, and there is at least an implicit risk for parties to invoke such a process.
Although failure to secure state approval would not necessarily defeat a cooperative arrangement as a matter of law, such a turndown could trigger antitrust enforcement review
or provide other stimulus for an antitrust challenge to the conduct reviewed in the state
procedure.
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date some form of active and "ongoing regulation by the State." 2 10
The risk to competition from such activities, and the need to police
the details of the implementation of such collective conduct, strongly
suggest that ongoing cooperative activities between or among private
parties should be subject to ongoing state involvement.
The toughest case is the merger situation, in which no ongoing
collective conduct occurs because the preexisting independent entities have been collapsed into a single unit. Large mergers are subject
to antitrust enforcement review prior to their culmination under
Hart-Scott-Rodino procedures and guidelines. 2 11 They also are subject to challenge after the fact by private parties if they have monopo2 12
lized the market.
In such a situation, it is questionable whether the single act of
front-end state regulatory approval would or should suffice under the
"active supervision" standard. Some form of ongoing review of pricing, for example, would seem essential to protect the merged business
from federal antitrust action when the merged entity exercises sufficient market power to set supracompetitive prices. A state also should
guard against the proliferation of artificial barriers to entry. Consumer choices regarding health care services must be respected, as
they would be in a competitive market. In short, even mergers justified on grounds of efficiency generate ongoing issues for the state to
review. Considerable discretion exists about exiting the market in certain areas and otherwise altering the circumstances that might have
existed when the merger was initially approved. These situations all
involve private choice without the accountability and oversight that
Ticor would seem to mandate.
Further, states may approve mergers on grounds other than effi2 13
ciency-for example, to achieve geographic or other access goals.
Allowing health care institutions to earn monopoly rents conceivably
could conform to state policies designed to facilitate cross subsidization; however, there is a wide range of private discretion in determining the level of cross subsidization and determining the priorities for
expending those funds through cross subsidization. Similarly, merg210
Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2176.
211
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 14 U.S.C. § 18a (1988), requires a simultaneous filing with the FTC and the DOJ of any transaction when the parties
are engaged in interstate commerce, and where one party has net sales or assets in excess
of $100 million, the other party has net sales or assets in excess of $10 million, and the

transaction involves the acquisition of at least 15% of the acquired party's stock or $15
million in assets. For a discussion of the DOJ-FTCJoint Enforcement Guidelines, see supra
note 10.
212 The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988), empowers any person threatened with injury by a violation of the Sherman or Clayton Acts to seek relief in the Federal Courts. See
HOLMES, supra note 105, at 711.
213
See supra note 181.
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ers to achieve geographic access in rural areas by protecting the economic viability of rural hospitals leave many details to private
decisionmaking. What services will the merged institution retain?
Which services will be added and under what criteria? Where might
the institution locate subsequent clinics or satellite units? What provisions for caring for the underserved will be required? What relationships with the physician community will be made? How will the
merged institution structure its participation in projected managed
care arrangements?
All of these decisions will be affected by the increased leverage
created by an anticompetitive merger. Ongoing oversight of the implementation of a merger deal therefore would seem to be critical. If
collective arrangements are to secure immunity from federal antitrust
laws, the details of their implementation must be the decision of the
state for which the state is politically accountable. Only ongoing and
active involvement by the state can assure that the public interest
(rather than the private parties' interest) is being served. Ticor appears to mandate such an ongoing regulatory and supervisory
2 14
structure.
CONCLUSION

The health care marketplace is evolving. Market-based principles
now have a greater role, in practice, than under the ancien regime of
a pure professional model. But the health care arena is still an ongoing ideological battleground. The application of antitrust law to the
health care industry has introduced and sustained market principles
in that arena.
Still, there remains institutional and doctrinal cacophony in the
health care industry. Doctrines, such as certain aspects of the antifraud and abuse laws, are premised on a philosophical and institutional regime hostile to market-based principles, yet they coexist with
other doctrines, such as antitrust, that are premised on traditional
market assumptions. The result is that ensuing legal battles replicate
the political battles that are so prevalent in the health care arena. As
the reality of the industry changes, leftover legal landmines impede
economically rational behavior. These doctrines persist even as their

214 Ticor, 112 S. Ct. 2169. There is the additional question of the ability of one state to
approve a merger when some of the facilities are located in other states. Will one state be
able to confer immunity nationwide if a party is incorporated or headquartered in a particular jurisdiction? Compare Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) with CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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underlying premises change and render them somewhat
2 15
anachronistic.
The state hospital cooperation laws represent a potentially revanchist attempt by the industry to restore professional and provider
dominance by reestablishing a more comfortable regime conducive to
cross subsidization. It may be that the antitrust enforcers have misunderstood the industry, and that the hospital cooperation legislation
truly attempts to preserve efficiency and to advance consumer welfare.
But experience with such planning and regulatory efforts has not
been reassuring. Promarket advocates are rightly skeptical of initiatives that eliminate antitrust law's assurance of a procompetitive environment. However, stringent state oversight requirements may mean
that the costs of implementing this legislation make it difficult to use
and therefore less destructive than one might fear.

215 Examples of this phenomenon abound. For example, Peer Review Organizations
(PROs) were to have a quality assurance but also a utilization review mission. With the

advent of prepayment through the diagnosis-related-group (DRG) method, the financial
risk shifted to hospitals. The underlying premise of PROs-that hospitals under cost-based
reimbursement had an incentive to escalate costs-changed dramatically, and their mission had to be modified. Similarly, the certificate-of-need laws became of questionable
application to health maintenance organizations, which faced the constraints of fixed payment. It is now reasonable to question whether the features of the fraud and abuse laws
discussed supra part I.C are anachronistic in the world of capitated payment and managed
care. The same questions arise regarding the corporate practice doctrine considered supra
part I.C.

